全球化研究报告-PDF版

世界贸易组织（WTO）：WTO争端解决：2020年一页案例摘要（英文版）（309页）.pdf

世贸组织争端解决：一页案情摘要增订本由世贸组织法律事务司在规则司和上诉机构秘书处的协助下编写。新版本包括世贸组织争端解决机构截至2020年12月31日通过的所有专家组和上诉机构报告，还包括一个单独的章.

2020-12-01 309页 5星级

世界贸易组织：2020年卫生与植物检疫措施协定（英文版）（16页）.pdf

2020年，世贸组织成员提交了2000多份SPS通知，创历史新高。这些关于拟议SPS法规的通知为成员提供了在措施草案生效前对其发表意见的机会，有助于减少贸易冲突的可能性。2020年的2122份SPS通.

2020-12-01 16页 5星级

世界贸易组织：2020年世界贸易报告（英文版）（208页）.pdf

世界贸易组织发布了2020年世界贸易报告。世界贸易报告旨在加深对贸易趋势、贸易政策问题和多边贸易体系的理解；探讨了创新和技术政策在日益数字化的世界经济中的作用，并解释了世贸组织在不断变化的环境中的作用.

2020-12-01 208页 5星级

美国半导体行业协会：2020美国半导体行业报告（英文版）（20页）.pdf

STATE OF THE U.S. SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY 2020 2 | SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION INTRODUCTION U.S. companies have for decades led the world in producing these tiny chips that power modern technologies. Our countrys leadership in semiconductors is a big reason America has the worlds largest economy and most advanced technologies. Since the onset in early 2020 of the COVID-19 pandemic, semiconductor-enabled technology has been deployed to find treatments, care for patients, work and study from home, order groceries and other essential products, and sustain countless other systems that underpin modern society. It is a reminder of the importance of semiconductors in responding to the worlds most urgent challenges and crises. The U.S. semiconductor industry has continued to maintain its global leadership position in semiconductor technologies essential for the future, including artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, and advanced wireless networks such as 5G. The U.S. semiconductor industry has also maintained its global market share leadership, even though worldwide year-over-year sales growth in 2019 was negative, and has kept steady its very high levels of investment in research and development (R sales leadership enables the U.S. industry to invest more into R and 2) having a competitive workforce. U.S. total capex investments were second only to Korea in 2019, and the U.S. led in spending for plant and equipment to manufacture advanced logic, where it accounted for 44 percent of the worlds total. A key U.S. advantage has been the ability to attract talented people from all over the globe who come to study at American universities and choose to stay. Having access to a highly educated workforce, strong in STEM, is critical to the future of Americas leadership in semiconductors. Semiconductors Alternative Energy Fixed Line Telecommunications Software and 2) a significant amount of semiconductor fab capacity resides in the United States. U.S. MANUFACTURING AND WORKFORCE Semiconductors are one of Americas top exports. Singapore All Others China Japan 17.4% Europe9.1% 8.8% 5.6% 5.0% 44.3%U.S. 9.9% Taiwan In 2019, about 44 percent of U.S.- headquartered firms front-end semiconductor wafer capacity was located in the United States. Other leading locations for U.S.-headquartered front-end semiconductor wafer fab capacity were Singapore, Taiwan, Europe, and Japan. It is notable that China has attracted less U.S. investment in front-end fabrication than the other major markets. Unfortunately, the average rate of chip manufacturing output has grown five times faster overseas than it has in the United States over the last decade. This is largely due to robust incentive programs nations have put in place to attract semiconductor manufacturing. The United States must consider similar incentives in order to remain competitive. U.S. semiconductor manufacturers maintain more of their manufacturing base in the United States than in any other country. PERCENT OF U.S.-HEADQUARTERED FIRM SEMICONDUCTOR WAFER CAPACITY BY LOCATION Semiconductors $46B Refined Oil $94B Aircraft $125B Crude Oil $65B Automobiles $48B TOP U.S. EXPORTS IN 2019 The U.S. semiconductor industry accounts for roughly a quarter of a million direct U.S. jobs and over a million additional indirect U.S. jobs. direct jobs in the U.S. semiconductor industry 241,134 U.S. semiconductor job supports ONE jobs in other parts in the U.S. economy. 4.89 American jobs .thats more than 1,000,000 ADDITIONAL 16 | SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION 2020 STATE OF THE U.S. SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY | 17 Over the past year, U.S. policymakers have taken steps toward advancing the industrys research, workforce, and trade and intellectual property (IP) priorities. Research: In 2019, the U.S. government continued to fund semiconductor research programs at the Departments of Energy (DOE) and Defense (DOD), the National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST), and the National Science Foundation (NSF). The Administration has also recently announced new research programs aimed at supporting the U.S. semiconductor industry, including DOEs quantum information science initiative and DODs Electronics Resurgence Initiative (ERI) and Microelectronics Innovation for National Security & Economic Competitiveness (MINSEC) programs. Workforce: Legislation in Congress, approved by the House but not yet the Senate, would eliminate unjustified and counterproductive per-country caps on employment-based visas in favor of a fair, “first-come, first-served” system. Trade & IP: The United States-Mexico- Canada Agreement (USMCA), a free trade agreement that would strengthen the U.S. semiconductor industry, has been signed by the President and approved by Congress. In addition, over the past year the federal government has increased its prosecution of IP trade theft cases. While progress in these three areas is welcome, more government action is needed to ensure a strong U.S. semiconductor industry and help the industry overcome challenges from China and other global competitors. The federal government is a key partner in developing policies that promote a strong and innovative U.S. semiconductor industry. U.S. SEMICONDUCTOR INNOVATION POLICY LANDSCAPE 18 | SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION To ensure continued U.S. leadership in the global semiconductor industry, the U.S. must adopt an ambitious competitiveness and innovation agenda. 1. Research: Triple U.S. investments in semiconductor- specific research across federal scientific agencies from approximately $1.5 billion to $5 billion annually to advance new materials, designs, and architectures that will exponentially increase chip performance. Double U.S. research investments in semiconductor-related fields such as materials science, computer science, engineering, and applied mathematics across federal scientific agencies to spur leap-ahead innovations in semiconductor technology that will drive key technologies of the future. 2. Domestic Manufacturing: Establish a new manufacturing grant program to spur construction of new onshore advanced semiconductor manufacturing facilities in the U.S., including leading-edge logic foundries, advanced memory, and analog fabs to supply defense, critical infrastructure, and broader essential commercial needs. Provide tax incentives for semiconductor manufacturing, such as a refundable investment tax credit for the purchase of new semiconductor manufacturing equipment. 3. Workforce: Reform the high-skilled immigration system so qualified STEM graduates from U.S. colleges and universities, as well as STEM graduates from around the world, can work, innovate, and contribute to U.S. leadership in the semiconductor industry and boost our economy. Increase U.S. investments in STEM education by 50 percent and implement a national STEM education initiative to double the number of American STEM graduates by 2029. 4. Trade and IP: Approve and modernize free trade agreements, including the United States- Mexico-Canada Agreement, that remove market barriers, protect IP, and enable fair competition. Increase resources for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to prevent and prosecute semiconductor intellectual property theft, including the misappropriation of trade secrets. By implementing these policies, Congress and the Administration can take key steps to protect American leadership in semiconductor technology and win the global competition for the technologies of the future. U.S. SEMICONDUCTOR INNOVATION POLICY LANDSCAPE 2020 STATE OF THE U.S. SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY | 19 METHODOLOGY This report is based on data development both in partnership with VLSI Research and independently by the Semiconductor Industry Association. Figures pertaining to the industrys employment are based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Department of Labor. Figures regarding the industrys international trade activity are based on an analysis of official U.S. government trade data from the U.S. ABOUT SIA The Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) is the voice of the semiconductor industry, one of Americas top export industries and a key driver of Americas economic strength, national security, and global competitiveness. Semiconductors the tiny chips that enable modern technologies power incredible products and services that have transformed our lives and our economy. The semiconductor industry directly employs nearly a quarter of a million workers in the United States, and U.S. semiconductor company International Trade Commission. Figures regarding industry manufacturing, capacity, and capital spending were based on data from SEMI, VLSI Research, EU Scoreboard, McKinsey, The Economist, Tokyo Electron, J.P. Morgan, and IC Insights. Market data was based on World Semiconductor Trade Statistics data. Lastly, industry R&D data was based on company financial reports, as well as data from the EU Scoreboard. sales totaled $193 billion in 2019. SIA members account for nearly 95 percent of all U.S. semiconductor industry sales. Through this coalition, SIA seeks to strengthen leadership of semiconductor manufacturing, design, and research by working with Congress, the Administration, and key industry stakeholders around the world to encourage policies that fuel innovation, propel business, and drive international competition. Learn more at www.semiconductors.org.

2020-10-30 20页 5星级

MindBody：2020年美国水疗趋势报告（英文版）（40页）.pdf

美国2020年水疗趋势身心健康指数一封来自我们的信健康意味着达到身体、心理和社交健康的完整状态，这需要健康来实现“健康”不是一个需要检查的盒子，也不是一个需要到达的目的地。这是一个通向更健康的身心的持.

2020-10-10 40页 5星级

MindBody：2020年美国健身趋势报告（英文版）（43页）.pdf

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2020-10-10 43页 5星级

2020我国与美国生活用纸行业比较分析市场驱动因素产业研究报告（45页）.pptx

2020年深度行业分析研究报告,一张图看懂本文框架,欣欣向荣期 (1970年之前),美国居民持续增长的财富有效 促进了消费潜力的释放,行业整合期 (1970-2000),“镀金时代”、“婴儿潮”带 来.

2020-09-27 46页 5星级

2020年美国网上零售药房店行业发展现状及趋势市场产业研究报告（33页）.pptx

2020年深度行业分析研究报告,目录,美国零售药房行业发展回顾及二级市场复盘,01,02,03,美国零售药房行业集中度提升趋势复盘与分析,美国网上药店的发展回顾与分析,04,国内零售药房行业趋势及相关.

2020-09-27 34页 5星级

2020年美国汽车售后维修服务市场行业产业龙头企业分析研究报告（54页）.docx

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2020-09-27 54页 5星级

2020年美国基础设施REITs市场发展现状典型案例行业研究产业报告（32页）.docx

2020 年深度行业分析研究报告内容目录1. 基础设施 REITs 介绍62. 美国基础设施 REITs 市场发展现状：起步晚发展快，收益率高流动性风险小63. 典型基础设施 REITs 介绍103.

2020-09-27 34页 5星级

2020全球美国及我国涂料行业市场发展现状比较分析产业研究报告（36页）.docx

一般而言，涂料根据化学属性可以分为有机涂料和无机涂料，其中有机涂料按用途可以分 为建筑涂料、OEM 涂料（Original Equipment Manufacture，相当于国内常用的工业涂料） 和特.

2020-09-27 36页 5星级

2020年美国金融体系中的气候风险管理报告 - 美国商品期货委员会（英文版）（196页）.pdf

MANAGING CLIMATE RISK IN THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM Report of the Climate-Related Market Risk Subcommittee, Market Risk Advisory Committee of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Commissioner Rostin Behnam, Sponsor Bob Litterman, Chairman Library of Congress Control Number: 2020915930 ISBN: 978-0-578-74841-2 This report is approved by the Subcommittee on Climate-Related Market Risk of the Market Risk Advisory Committee (MRAC). The views, analyses, and conclusions expressed herein reflect the work of the Subcommittee on Climate-Related Market Risk of the MRAC, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the MRAC, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission or its staff, or the U.S. Government. Reference to any products, services, websites, organizations, or enterprises, or the use of any organization, trade, firm, or corporation name is for informational purposes only and does not constitute endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the U.S. Government. To view individual subcommittee members concurring statements, if any, please see cftc.gov. MANAGING CLIMATE RISK IN THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM Report of the Climate-Related Market Risk Subcommittee, Market Risk Advisory Committee of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Commissioner Rostin Behnam, Sponsor David Gillers, Chief of Staff, Office of Commissioner Behnam Bob Litterman, Chairman Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, Editor Jesse M. Keenan, Editor Stephen Moch, Associate Editor Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .i List of Tables and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi List of Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xvii Chapter 1: Introduction to Finance in the Face of Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Chapter 2: Physical and Transition Risks in the Context of the United States . . . . . . . 11 Chapter 3: Implications of Climate Change for the U.S. Financial System. . . . . . . . . . 25 Chapter 4: Existing Authorities and Recommendations for Financial Regulators . . . . . 41 Chapter 5: A Closer Look at Climate Risk Management and Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Chapter 6: A Closer Look at Climate Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Chapter 7: A Closer Look at Climate Risk Disclosure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Chapter 8: A Closer Look at Financing the Net-Zero Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 List of Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 Members of the Climate-Related Market Risk Subcommittee. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 Table of Contents Climate change poses a major risk to the stability of the U.S. financial system and to its ability to sustain the American economy. Climate change is already impacting or is anticipated to impact nearly every facet of the economy, including infrastructure, agriculture, residential and commercial property, as well as human health and labor productivity. Over time, if significant action is not taken to check rising global average temperatures, climate change impacts could impair the productive capacity of the economy and undermine its ability to generate employment, income, and opportunity. Even under optimistic emissions- reduction scenarios, the United States, along with countries around the world, will have to continue to cope with some measure of climate change-related impacts. This reality poses complex risks for the U.S. financial system. Risks include disorderly price adjustments in various asset classes, with possible spillovers into different parts of the financial system, as well as potential disruption of the proper functioning of financial markets. In addition, the process of combating climate change itselfwhich demands a large-scale transition to a net-zero emissions economywill pose risks to the financial system if markets and market participants prove unable to adapt to rapid changes in policy, technology, and consumer preferences. Financial system stress, in turn, may further exacerbate disruptions in economic activity, for example, by limiting the availability of credit or reducing access to certain financial products, such as hedging instruments and insurance. A major concern for regulators is what we dont know. While understanding about particular kinds of climate risk is advancing quickly, understanding about how different types of climate risk could interact remains in an incipient stage. Physical and transition risks may well unfold in parallel, compounding the challenge. Climate risks may also exacerbate financial system vulnerabilities that have little to do with climate change, such as historically high levels of corporate leverage. This is particularly concerning in the short- and medium-term, as the COVID 19 pandemic is likely to leave behind stressed balance sheets, strained government budgets, and depleted household wealth, which, taken together, undermine the resilience of the financial system to future shocks. i EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Executive Summary The central message of this report is that U.S. financial regulators must recognize that climate change poses serious emerging risks to the U.S. financial system, and they should move urgently and decisively to measure, understand, and address these risks. Achieving this goal calls for strengthening regulators capabilities, expertise, and data and tools to better monitor, analyze, and quantify climate risks. It calls for working closely with the private sector to ensure that financial institutions and market participants do the same. And it calls for policy and regulatory choices that are flexible, open-ended, and adaptable to new information about climate change and its risks, based on close and iterative dialogue with the private sector. At the same time, the financial community should not simply be reactiveit should provide solutions. Regulators should recognize that the financial system can itself be a catalyst for investments that accelerate economic resilience and the transition to a net-zero emissions economy. Financial innovations, in the form of new financial products, services, and technologies, can help the U.S. economy better manage climate risk and help channel more capital into technologies essential for the transition. Findings of the Report This report begins with a fundamental findingfinancial markets will only be able to channel resources efficiently to activities that reduce greenhouse gas emissions if an economy-wide price on carbon is in place at a level that reflects the true social cost of those emissions. Addressing climate change will require policy frameworks that incentivize the fair and effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. In the absence of such a price, financial markets will operate suboptimally, and capital will continue to flow in the wrong direction, rather than toward accelerating the transition to a net-zero emissions economy. At the same time, policymakers must be sensitive to the distributional impacts of carbon pricing and other policies and ensure that the burden does not fall on low-to-moderate income households and on historically marginalized communities. This report recognizes that pricing carbon is beyond the remit of financial regulators; it is the job of Congress. A central finding of this report is that climate change could pose systemic risks to the U.S. financial system. Climate change is expected to affect multiple sectors, geographies, and assets in the United States, sometimes simultaneously and within a relatively short timeframe. As mentioned earlier, transition and physical risksas well as climate and non-climate-related riskscould interact with each other, amplifying shocks and stresses. This raises the prospect of spillovers that could disrupt multiple parts of the financial system simultaneously. In addition, systemic shocks are more likely in an environment in which financial assets do not fully reflect climate-related physical and transition risks. A sudden revision of market perceptions about climate risk could lead to a disorderly repricing of assets, which could in turn have cascading effects on portfolios and balance sheets and therefore systemic implications for financial stability. MANAGING CLIMATE RISK IN THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEMii At the same time, this report finds that regulators should also be concerned about the risk of climate-related “sub-systemic” shocks. Sub-systemic shocks are defined in this report as those that affect financial markets or institutions in a particular sector, asset class, or region of the country, but without threatening the stability of the financial system as a whole. This is especially relevant for the United States, given the countrys size and its financial system, which includes thousands of financial institutions, many regulated at the state level. Sub-systemic shocks related to climate change can undermine the financial health of community banks, agricultural banks, or local insurance markets, leaving small businesses, farmers, and households without access to critical financial services. This is particularly damaging in areas that are already underserved by the financial system, which includes low-to-moderate income communities and historically marginalized communities. The report finds that, in general, existing legislation already provides U.S. financial regulators with wide-ranging and flexible authorities that could be used to start addressing financial climate-related risk now. This is true across four areasoversight of systemic financial risk, risk management of particular markets and financial institutions, disclosure and investor protection, and the safeguarding of financial sector utilities. Presently, however, these authorities and tools are not being fully utilized to effectively monitor and manage climate risk. Further rulemaking, and in some cases legislation, may be necessary to ensure a coordinated national response. While some early adopters have moved faster than others in recent years, regulators and market participants around the world are generally in the early stages of under- standing and experimenting with how best to monitor and manage climate risk. Given the considerable complexities and data challenges involved, this report points to the need for regulators and market participants to adopt pragmatic approaches that stress continual monitoring, experimentation, learning, and global coordination. Regulatory approaches in this area are evolving and should remain open to refinement, especially as understanding of climate risk continues to advance and new data and tools become available. Insufficient data and analytical tools to measure and manage climate-related financial risks remain a critical constraint. To undertake climate risk analysis that can inform decision-making across the financial system, regulators and financial institutions need reliable, consistent, and comparable data and projections for climate risks, exposure, sensitivity, vulnerability, and adaptation and resilience. Demand will likely grow for public and open access to climate data, including for primary data collected by the government. Public data will enable market participants to, among other things, compare publicly available disclosure information and sustainability-benchmarked financial products. At the same time, proprietary data and analytical products can introduce innovations that improve climate risk management. A key challenge will be how best to balance the need for transparency through public data on one hand, with the need to foster private innovation through proprietary data, on the other. iii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The lack of common definitions and standards for climate-related data and financial products is hindering the ability of market participants and regulators to monitor and manage climate risk. While progress has been made in this area thanks to voluntary disclosure frameworks and work by foreign regulators, the lack of standards, and differences among standards, remains a barrier to effective climate risk management. The problem is compounded by a lack of international coordination on data and methodology standards. A common set of definitions for climate risk data, including modeling and calculation methodologies, is important for developing the consistent, comparable, and reliable data required for effective risk management. Also, taxonomies or classification systems can help foster greater transparency and comparability in markets for financial products labeled as “green” or “sustainable.” Climate-related scenario analysis can be a useful tool to enable regulators and market participants to understand and manage climate-related risks. Scenarios illustrate the complex connections and dependencies across technologies, policies, geographies, societal behaviors, and economic outcomes as the world shifts toward a net-zero emissions future. Scenario analysis can help organizations integrate climate risks and opportunities into a broader risk management framework, as well as understand the potential short-term impact of specific triggering events. Scenario analysis is gaining traction in several contexts, both domestically and internationally, and regulators are increasingly using scenario analysis to foster greater risk awareness among financial market actors. Yet, the limitations of scenario analysis should be recognized. While useful, climate scenarios and the models that analyze them have important limitations. Scenarios are sensitive to key assumptions and parameters, most have been developed for purposes other than financial risk analysis, and they cannot fully capture all the potential effects of climate- and policy-driven outcomes. Scenario analysis should have a valuable place in the risk management toolkit, but it should be used with full awareness of what it can and cannot do. The disclosure by corporations of information on material, climate-related financial risks is an essential building block to ensure that climate risks are measured and managed effectively. Disclosure of such information enables financial regulators and market participants to better understand climate change impacts on financial m

2020-09-25 196页 5星级

麦肯锡（McKinsey）：亚洲未来报告（英文版）（20页）.pdf

July 2019 Asias future is now McKinsey Global Institute Since its founding in 1990, the McKinsey Glo.

2020-08-01 20页 5星级

Adjust：2020年超休闲游戏报告（英文版）（28页）.pdf

在新冠肺炎疫情期间，践行社交距离的消费者数量创下了纪录，许多人利用休息时间发现新游戏或沉迷于旧游戏。全球游戏调整数据显示，2020年第一季度的消费支出、应用参与度和下载量都创下了历史新高。世界各地的人.

2020-07-02 28页 5星级

美国烈酒协会：2020年美国精酿烈酒年度经济简报（英文版）（43页）.pdf

2020Key Messages(续)美国手工酒出口同比去年下降了57.6%，至2019年的总出口量为15.5万箱，占美国手工酒总出口量的1.4%。许多接受调查的零售商和批发商认为，随着时间的推移，精酿烈酒有可能与精酿啤酒表现一致，甚至更好。目前，精酿啤酒在美国的市场份额为14.3%，预计精酿烈酒市场将继续快速增长。

2020-07-02 43页 5星级

Adjust：2020年移动应用趋势报告（英文版）（32页）.pdf

在3月的最后一周，该平台的安装量比去年增长了一倍多(132%)，因为全球用户待在家里的时间越来越长。总体而言，与2019年第一季度相比，2020年第一季度游戏应用的使用次数增加了47%，安装量增加了7.

2020-07-02 32页 5星级

美国户外产业协会（OIA）：2020年美国户外消费市场预测报告（英文版）（33页）.pdf

户外消费市场的格局正在演变，随之发生变化经济、社会和人口变化。作为OIA消费者细分研究的一部分，这份报告调查了重要的影响和这五个宏观转变将继续对户外行业以及美国户外消费人口的七个细分市场带来机遇。展望2020年，由于人口结构变化、城市移民、肥胖上升和对健康生活的强调等因素的影响，户外运动行业预计将面临前所未有的颠覆。

2020-07-02 33页 5星级

Adjust：2020年移动购物应用报告-最新用户获取趋势和数据基准（英文版）（42页）.pdf

亚太地区的观众在成本上领先，但在参与度上却垫底。拉美或许以低成本著称，但北美则以无与伦比的价格和比亚太地区高出6倍的安装至购买率而闪耀。欧洲、中东和非洲是渴望购物的地方，但购物率比北美低50%，这是一.

2020-07-02 42页 5星级

Adjust：2020年移动金融报告-银行、支付和投资类应用的全球数据基准（英文版）（29页）.pdf

我们的主要发现包括:从2020年1月到6月，允许用户通过手机直接交易股票的投资应用程序的活跃度大幅增长，平均每天增长88%。在全球范围内，投资应用是2020年Adjust跟踪的增长第二快的垂直领域，A.

2020-07-02 29页 5星级

国际海上保险联盟（IUMI）：2020年全球海上保险市场分析报告（英文版）（42页）.pdf

本报告中的大部分图表来源于事实与数据委员会主席菲利普格雷厄姆和副主席阿斯特丽德塞尔特曼在2020年IUMI会议上的陈述。这些包含更多的图表和市场趋势供参考。虽然这是一个统计报告，但我们不能忘记，航运是.

2020-07-02 42页 5星级