基于细粒度功率域划分的硬件木马检测.pdf

1、T.Ishikawa(1/21)(Invited Paper)Hardware Trojan Detectionby Fine-grained Power Domain PartitioningTakahiro Ishikawa 1,Kose Yokooji1,Yoshihiro Midoh1,Noriyuki Miura1,Michihiro Shintani2,Jun Shiomi11 Osaka University,Japan2 Kyoto Institute of Technology,JapanT.Ishikawa(2/21)About Hardware TrojansHardwa

2、re Trojans(HTs)Malicious circuits inserted into integrated circuits Inserted in supply chainThreats Leak confidential information Sabotage/Destroy systemT.Ishikawa(3/21)Attack ScenarioFab injects HTsAttacker can access GDS and EDA toolsCountermeasure:Power measurement LLHard to distinguish HT power6

3、T.D.Perez and S.Pagliarini,Hardware Trojan Insertion in Finalized Layouts:From Methodology to a Silicon Demonstration,“in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems,vol.42,no.7,pp.2094-2107,July 2023HT power ratio is lowT.Ishikawa(4/21)Proposal:Fine-grained Power D

4、omain PartitioningDivide circuit into multiple tiny power domains Measure power consumption ofeach power domain separately Increase power ratio of HTsHTs detected in a 180-nm process chipResult Related work:(Max)9.3%HT power ratio5 Test vector optimization for HT activation Proposed:(Max)2572%HT pow

5、er ratio5 Nigh,C.and Orailoglu,A.:AdaTrust:Combinational Hardware Trojan Detection Through Adaptive Test Pattern Construction,IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration(VLSI)Systems,Vol.29,No.3,2021.Chip layoutPower ratio:Pw/HTPw/o HTPw/o HTT.Ishikawa(5/21)OutlineBackgroundFine-grained Power

6、Domain PartitioningHardware Trojan Detection Results using a 180-nm processConclusionT.Ishikawa(6/21)StructureEach power domain is connected to VDDMAIN and VDDSUB through power switchesConnect only one power domainto VDDSUB for HT detection Example:Power Domain 1 SW1 1 Other SWs 0SW signals storedin