1、DETECTING CARTELS FOR EX OFFICIO INVESTIGATIONSOECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers2 DETECTING CARTELS FOR EX OFFICIO INVESTIGATIONS OECD 2024 This paper is part of the series“OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers”,https:/doi.org/10.1787/20758677.This document was originally release

2、d on O.N.E.as an unclassified document under the reference code:DAF/COMP/LACCF(2024)33.This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD.The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Member countries of th

3、e OECD.This document,as well as any data and map included herein,are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory,to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory,city or area.Cover illustration:Jacob Wackerhausen|iStock-Getty Ima

4、ges Plus.OECD 2024 The use of this work,whether digital or print,is governed by the Terms and Conditions to be found at https:/www.oecd.org/termsandconditions.3 DETECTING CARTELS FOR EX OFFICIO INVESTIGATIONS OECD 2024 Foreword Competition authorities have developed various tools to detect cartels a

5、nd substantiate the basis for opening investigations.Ex officio investigations,meaning investigations initiated by the authorities themselves,are derived from detection tools that require a higher level of proactivity from the competition authority,for instance through industry monitoring and cartel

6、 screenings.New technologies such as artificial intelligence also provide competition authorities with greater opportunities to improve their detection efforts.This paper provides an overview of detection tools to launch ex officio cartel investigations,including recent trends and experiences from L