BLACK&VEATCH THOUGHT LEADERSHIPSodium Ion Batteries What Do They Mean for BESS?April 2025SODIUM ION BATTERIES WHAT DO THEY MEAN FOR BESS?|2 PrefaceThe global BESS installed base stood at 150GW/363GWh in 2024,an enormous jump from approximately 20GW(gigawatt)/40GWh(gigawatt hour)in 2020.A key driver for this rapid growth has been falling pack prices,which dropped by 30 percent from 2020 to 2023 globally.Over the longer period 2013-2024,the fall has been a paradigm shifting 86percent(Volta Foundation).The evolution of battery size has also been noteworthy.In 2017,South Australias Hornsdale power reserve at 100MW(megawatt)/129MWh(megawatt hour)was the worlds largest grid scale battery.Today,the Edwards&Sandborn facility in California is the largest operational BESS worldwide,at 821MW/3280MWh.The economics of longer duration batteries has also been made possible by falling pack prices to the point where BESS is a default component of a renewables project.Around 98percent of BESS capacity is from lithium ion batteries.Lithium,being relatively scarce,is subject to commodity price cycles and volatility,which has prompted the search for alternative materials,chief amongst them being sodium.Sodium Ion Batteries(also called SIBs,NIBs,or Na-ion batteries)are rechargeable batteries that are similar in their operating principle(rocking chair design)to Lithium Ion Batteries(LIB)but employ different materials in their construction.In this report,we have looked at the current and future economics of SIB versus LFP(Lithium Ferrophosphate),and highlighted some key features to watch out for as this exciting new technology develops.Get in touch with our team to learn more about our experience with BESS:Harry HarjiSaikat SenguptaMick ScrivensAssociate Vice President,Asia,Middle East and Africa,Strategic Advisory Director,Strategic Advisory,AustraliaDirector,Australia PacificHarjiHSenguptaSScrivensMContact our global team through more: report was written in January 2025 and reflects the state of the market at the beginning of the year.It does not capture the impact of the recently announced global trade tariffs on material and construction costs.SODIUM ION BATTERIES WHAT DO THEY MEAN FOR BESS?|3 Table of ContentsIntroduction-What are Sodium Ion Batteries(SIBs)?.4 SIBs are rechargeable batteries for the low price/low energy density market .4 SIBs are primarily classified by their cathode chemistries(like LIBs).4 Chinese companies lead the commercialisation of SIB technology .4The demand for SIB may come fro a flat or rising LFP price.6 The weighted average LIB pack price has fallen by 86 percent since 2013 .6 Chinese LIB(LFP)cell prices have continued to fall month by month in 2024 .7 Indications are that LFP prices will rise again.8SIBs are becoming competitive with LIBs at the cell and pack level .9 SIB cells are more expensive than LIB(LFP)right now.9 The price gap between SIB and LIB(LFP)is narrowing and may close.9Will SIB get cheap enough to be adopted in BESS?.10 China is fast becoming an SIB powerhouse,which means lower costs .10 SIB has already been deployed in BESS at grid scale .10 SIB has certain important differences with LFP,including a lower energy density .10 Leading to SIB based BESS being more expensive than LFP .11 SIBs may still be competitive against LFP for BESS in the future .12 SIBs competitiveness under certain conditions.12Appendix:SIB versus LIB Comparisons .13References .15Glossary .16About Black&Veatch .17About Infrastructure Advisory .17SODIUM ION BATTERIES WHAT DO THEY MEAN FOR BESS?|4 Introduction What are Sodium Ion Batteries(SIBs)?SIBs are rechargeable batteries for the low price/low energy density marketSodium Ion Batteries(also called SIBs,NIBs,or Na-ion batteries)are rechargeable batteries that are similar in their operating principle(rocking chair design)to Lithium Ion Batteries(LIB)but employ different materials in their construction.Outwardly,SIB and LIB cells have the same form factor(cylindrical,prismatic,pouch)and structure(coated electrodes,electrolyte,tabs).SIBs have the advantages of being made from cheaper,widely available materials1,and depending on the cathode chemistry potentially also being safer than LIBs2 including the LFP chemistry,the most common LIB chemistry for BESS.SIBs are intermediate in energy density between LIBs and the traditional lead acid batteries,which are still widely used in backup battery and consumer market applications for their low price.The wider expectation is for SIB to substitute for LIB in low end EVs,e-bikes,and potentially BESS,where energy density can be traded off for price.SIBs are primarily classified by their cathode chemistries(like LIBs)Differences under the hood arise primarily from the sodium ion being much larger than the lithium ion.Due to this,SIBs have very different cathode and anode materials than LIBs.Having a higher reduction potential also means that SIBs can have Aluminium foil at both electrodes rather than Aluminium at the anode and the much more expensive Copper at the cathode,as with LIBs.The popular cathode families in lithium ion batteries are layered transition metal oxides(TMO)such as LCO(Lithium Cobalt Oxide),NMC(Lithium Nickel Manganese Cobalt),and NCA(Lithium Nickel Cobalt Aluminium),or phosphate based polyanions,such as LFP.The same two families exist in the SIB world(Table 1).A point to note is that even where SIB and LIB cathodes are chemically similar,they may be structurally different.For instance,LiFePO4 and NaFePO4 differ in crystal structure:olivine for Lithium and maricite for SIB.A third cathode family in SIBs comprise Prussian Blue and Prussian White Analogues(PBA/PWA).These have no commercial analogue in the Lithium ion world.While possessing lower energy density per unit of weight,PBA/PWA are capable of high C-rates(fast charge/discharge).Anodes in the SIB world are commonly made from hard or soft carbon(this is the case with the Chinese companies and Faradion),which is a key point of difference with LIBs that use graphite.Natron Energy uses PBAs for both the cathode and the anode.Chinese companies lead the commercialisation of SIB technologyChina leads the commercialisation of SIBs with HiNa Battery Technology Co.,Ltd.(HiNa Battery)in Beijing,China;Contemporary Amperex Technology Co.,Ltd.(CATL)in Ningde,China;Zhejiang Sodium Innovation Energy Co.,Ltd.(Natrium)in Shaoxing,and China;Li-Fun Technology Co.,Ltd.(LiFun)in Zhuzhou,China,amongst others.(Qixing Jia 1,et al.,2024).Notable western companies are Faradion in the UK(acquired by Indias Reliance Group in 2021)and Natron Energy in the US.A longer list of companies by cathode chemistry family are shown in Table 1.1 Sodium is at 23600 ppm in the earths crust compared to 20 ppm for Lithium(Abraham,2020).Other cost savings are from having an aluminium vs copper collector at the cathode and potentially hard carbon versus graphite for the anode,or alternatives such as Natron Energys 100 percent Mn based Prussian Blue for the cathode and 60/40 Fe/Mn Prussian blue for the anode.2 Layered NIBs are intermediate between LFP and NMC.However,Prussian blue analogue SIBs are safer than layered SIBs.SODIUM ION BATTERIES WHAT DO THEY MEAN FOR BESS?|5 Table 1.Families of Cathode Materials for SIBsCathode MaterialProviderTransition Metal Oxides(TMO)HiNa BatteryVeken TechnologyNatrium EnergySVOLTFaradionEVE EnergyCATLLiFun TechnologyTransimage Sodium-Ion Battery(Jiangsu Chuanyi Technology Co.,Ltd)TiannengDuofludo(Shenzhen DFD Energy Storage Technology Co.,Ltd)Great PowerBYDPolyanion Compounds(P)Zoolnasm(Zhongna Energy)Natrium EnergyTransimage Sodium-Ion Battery(Jiangsu Chuanyi Technology Co.,Ltd)Puna EnergyGreat PowerPNA Times Jana Energy(Jnion)Wanrun New EnergyBYDPrussian blue compounds(PBA)Prussian white compounds(PWA)Natron EnergyCATLLiFun TechnologyAltrisStar Sodium(Xingkong Sodium Electric)Duofludo(Shenzhen DFD Energy Storage Technology Co.,Ltd)SODIUM ION BATTERIES WHAT DO THEY MEAN FOR BESS?|6 The demand for SIB may come from a flat or rising LFPprice Indications are that LFP prices are close to the bottom,and second generation SIBs will be competitive at a cell level with LFP by 2030.This is discussed below.The weighted average LIB pack price has fallen by 86 percent since 2013There has been a steep drop in all pack and cell prices from 2013 to 2018 when costs fell 23percent,then a more gradual trend from 2018 to 2024 where costs fell by 10 percent(Figure1).This fall was driven initially by scale economies,then by chemistry(moving from high-cobalt to high-nickel chemistries and the expansion of the LFP-dominant Chinese market),and finally by engineering optimisation.3In a reversal of the trend,pack prices rose in 2022 from US$155/kwh(kilowatt hour)to US$166/kwh,as commodity prices soared all around.Spot prices of both lithium carbonate and hydroxide reached over RMB 575,000/t(tonne)(US$82,225/t)while,nickel hit US$100,000/t on the London Metal Exchange(Benchmark Minerals,2022).With the crash in commodity prices in 2024,battery costs started falling again.Figure 1.Global Volume-Weighted Average Lithium Ion Pack Price(US$/kwh),2013-2024Source:BNEF,SMM.3 For most of this paper,the only LIB chemistry of interest is Lithium Iron Phosphate(LFP),which is cheaper than higher energy density chemistries such as NMC and NCA.LFP is the chemistry of choice for Battery Energy Storage Systems(BESS)and lower end Electric Vehicles(EVs)and is the chemistry that SIBs will compete with.20242023202220212020201920182017201620152014201312,16750,28867,27916,8029,98214,1517,10822,04024,787Global pack price(US$/kwh)Lithium carbonate price(US$/t LCE)115144166155165189218266356463715806-86%SODIUM ION BATTERIES WHAT DO THEY MEAN FOR BESS?|7 Chinese LIB(LFP)cell prices have continued to fall month by month in 2024In China,pack prices rose from US$111/kwh in 2021 to US$127/kwh in 2022 and remained high in 2023 before crashing in 2024 to US$94/kwh,reflecting the movement of the underlying Lithium carbonate price(Figure 2).The pricing of cells to third party integrators showed an even steeper drop in 2024,crashing to US$47/kwh on average for the year from US$95/kwh in 2023.Figure 2.Average Annual Chinese LFP Pack Prices and Cell Prices to Third-Party Integrators(US$/kwh)Source:BNEF,Energy China CATL.VAT included.Source:Energy China CATL.VAT included.Pack(US$/kwh)Cell(US$/kwh)2024202320222021944795126127111The trend is even more apparent on a month-by-month basis,with LFP cell prices for both the 280 Ah(ampere hour)and 314 Ah(prismatic)formats falling to US$42-43/kwh by November 2024(Figure 3).Larger format cells are able to achieve cost advantages by having a higher ratio of active material in the electrodes to the dead material of everything else in the cell.4 Note that prismatic cell sizes have been getting increasingly larger to drive down costs,with Hithium at the top of the list,with an announcement made in 2024 for a 1130 Ah cell(Energy Storage News,2025).Figure 3.Average Monthly Chinese LFP Cell Prices to Third-Party Integrators in 2024(US$/kwh)4 As an example,the 314 Ah format,launched in June 2024,was initially priced above the 280 Ah variant,but the gap quickly closed and we would expect it to be more competitive than 280 Ah in the future.280 Ah(US$/kwh)314 Ah(US$/kwh)6058535048485446504549454743464243Nov-24Oct-24Sep-24Aug-24Jul-24Jun-24May-24Apr-24Mar-24Feb-24Jan-24SODIUM ION BATTERIES WHAT DO THEY MEAN FOR BESS?|8 Indications are that LFP prices will rise againEven after accounting for the slump in the lithium market,current prices of LFP cells in China appear to be close to our estimated variable costs(US$37/kwh being the average LFP cell price at the time of writing in January 2025,which is well below the full cost of US$47/kwh even for low end LFP cells,but somewhere close to the variable cost)(Figure4).In usual circumstances,such thin margins would automatically see markets rebalance and pricing trend upwards again.That would see LFP pricing climb back to US$47-55/kwh at the cell level.In China,however,periods of oversupply are known to persist,and we cant be certain about how soon a natural price correction will occur.A more definite price rise may come from rising input costs.Commentators and analysts expect the lithium price to lift in the near term,with US$15,000/t LCE(Lithium Carbonate Equivalent)being a reasonable steady state future price(this is also the assumed price for Rio Tintos Jadar Lithium project)(Rio Tinto,2025).At that commodity price,Chinese LFP pricing may climb back to US$44-59/kwh for high end cells going into BESS applications.A still higher lithium price,which is inevitable in the cyclical commodities market,will make the case for SIBs as an alternative to LFP still more compelling.Figure 4.Estimated China LFP Cell Costs Based on Long-Term and Current Spot Prices of Lithium Carbonate and Cathode Active Material with the Current LFP Cell Price in China(US$37/kwh)Shown for ComparisonLFP high end cell based on lithium pricing at 15 k/t LCE(US$/kwh)LFP cell based on Jan 2025 input costs high end(US$/kwh)LFP cell based on Jan 2025 input costs low end(US$/kwh)44403359554737Total CostVariable CostSource:Black&Veatch analysis.Assumes a 250 Wh prismatic cell.VAT included.SODIUM ION BATTERIES WHAT DO THEY MEAN FOR BESS?|9 SIBs are becoming competitive with LIBs at the cell and pack levelSIB cells are more expensive than LIB(LFP)right nowConsumer market sodium ion battery packs are still more expensive than their LFP counterparts on a US$/kwh basis,as experienced on direct-to-consumer websites(Figure 5).Figure 5.Cell and Pack Prices for Consumer Grade SIB and LIB(LFP)Batteries Delivered to Australia(US$/kwh)PackPackPrismaticPrismatic321403214018650PackPackPrismaticPrismaticPrismatic32140321401865036630919030429141625218618215413912891382LIB(LFP)SIBSource:Online retailing websites.Note:these are delivered-to-Australia prices,and a multiple of the pricing to OEM consumers.Source:Inside EVs.Note:the(?)indicates that these are rumoured rather than verified prices.The price gap between SIB and LIB(LFP)is narrowing and may closeSeveral media reports in 2021,quoting each other and the same Chinese media sources reported that OEM pricing for SIB was already available at a lower price point than LFP at a cell level(Inside EVs,2021).According to Chinese media reports,sodium-ion cells should start at 500 CNY($77)per kwh at a small scale,while at a volume scale the cost will be halved to 200-300 CNY($31-$47)per kwh,which potentially would be very competitive(Figure 6).Figure 6.LFP Versus SIB Cell Pricing Current And Future(US$/kwh)(LFP Assumes an Elevated Lithium Market and Pricing at Full Cost)77?4759LFP cells(US$/kwh)SIB cells(US$/kwh)2030202437SODIUM ION BATTERIES WHAT DO THEY MEAN FOR BESS?|10 Will SIB get cheap enough to be adopted in BESS?China is fast becoming an SIB powerhouse,which means lower costsAs of the end of June 2023,Chinas dedicated SIB capacity reached 10 GWh,an increase of 8GWh from the end of 2022.Since 2023,more than 22 companies have released new SIBs,more than 31 sodium-ion power companies have obtained financing,and more than 80 sodium-ion power projects have been signed/started.In January 2024,it was reported that BYD has started construction on a 30 GWh plant in Xuzhou(Car News China,2024).The total global pipeline of SIB projects was reported to be 100 GWh in 2023,almost all of them in China(Benchmark Minerals,2023).SIB has already been deployed in BESS at grid scaleSIB is initially being targeted at the low end EV and e-bike market,where the volumes are large.However,BESS is also being selectively rolled out in grid scale projects in China(Table 2).Table 2.Sodium Ion Bess Projects in ChinaFulin Datang HuBei Guangdong Development LocationNanning,Guangxi Province,ChinaQianjiang,Hubei Province,ChinaHonghu,Hubei Province,ChinaCapacity2.5MW/10MWh Phase 150MW/100 MWh Phase 150MW/100 MWh Phase 1 StatusOperational in May 2024Operational in June 2024Construction in June 2024ProviderHiNa 185 Ah/210 Ah Cell HiNa 185 Ah Cell/System integration by CRRCVeken 230 Ah Cell/System integration by RobestecBESS unit 2.36 MWh Containerized BESS,20HC,Liquid-cooled.3.611 MWh Containerized BESS,45HC,Air-cooled.SIB has certain important differences with LFP,including a lower energy densityOther,less impactful differences are:The operating voltage of Na-ion cell drops linearly as it charges or discharges.By contrast,the voltage profile of Li ion is much flatter.Typical ranges for Na-ion in operation are 2.0-3.85V(voltage)or 1.5-3.95V,depending on the material used,while for LFP voltage ranges from 2.5-3.65V.This requires the Power Conversion System(PCS)to have either an additional DC(Direct Current)/DC converter or a buck/boost converter with low AC(Alternating Current)input voltage,which reduces system efficiency and increases cost.Current testing results for SIB indicates that the heat generation during discharging is almost twice that during charging.This presents challenges for cooling design,cell temperature rise,and cell temperature consistency,cell voltage consistency.Compared to LFP batteries,which have a self-discharge rate of no more than 3 percent per month,SIBs have a higher self-discharge rate of approximately 5-6 percent.There are differences between LFP and SIB that impact overall costs.The main one is the lower energy density of SIB.A 20-foot containerized SIB BESS system can ship 2.36 MWh with liquid cooling,while a 45-foot containerized system can ship 3.61 MWh with air cooling.In contrast,a typical 20-foot containerized LFP system can ship 5 MWh.SODIUM ION BATTERIES WHAT DO THEY MEAN FOR BESS?|11 The BESS system(including modules,racks,FSS,BMS,HVAC,PCS,and container)accounts for roughly 50 percent of the cost of a project.The modules could be 50-60 percent of the cost of the BESS system at current prices.While SIB can achieve a lower price per kwh at the cell level,it does not compensate for the lower energy that can be fit inside a container within the existing standard BESS architecture.Under this approach,future SIB BESS projects would be more expensive than LFP based projects with 2023 LFP cell prices(Figure 7).Leading to SIB based BESS being more expensive than LFPThe Datang Hubei project also provides a case study.It is a 50MW/100MWh SIB BESS project over 30 acres,connected to the grid in Qianjiang province,China.The project consists of 42 BESS containers with 185Ah SIBs,21 power conversion system(PCS)units,and a 110kV booster station.A 2.5MW string PCS MV turnkey solution is designed to support rated output power from 700V to 1500V.(Sineng Electric,2024).The project cost for phase 1 was reported at RMB 200 million,which puts the capex at RMB 2,000/kwh or US$278/kwh.This is significantly higher than the project costs of LFP projects in China,which were around US$125-136/kwh based on 2023 Lithium prices.5Figure 7.BESS Project CapEx Estimates(Including Development Costs)of LFP Versus SIB in the United States and China(US$/kwh)Note It is assumed that the SIB BESS architecture and module sizing is identical to LFP,and only the LFP modules are swapped out for SIB modules.331136278403348USA at 2030SIB cell price(?)USA at 2024SIB cell price(?)China at 2024SIB cell price(?)China at 2023LFP cell priceUSA at 2023LFP cell priceSource:Black&Veatch analysis.Note:the(?)indicates that these costs are based on the rumoured prices of SIB cells.It is assumed here that United States projects are developed based on Chinese SIB cells.5 According to BNEF,a December 2024 BESS bid in China for battery enclosures PCS came in at US$66/kwh,a hitherto unheard cost level.(VoltaFoundation).SODIUM ION BATTERIES WHAT DO THEY MEAN FOR BESS?|12 SIBs may still be competitive against LFP for BESS in the futureSIBs are penalised for their low energy densities in BESS,where non-cell costs are in the majority.The breakup of a typical LFP BESS at 2023 prices in the US is shown in Figure 7.Only 55 percent of the cost is from the battery container,and the module made up for 60 percent of this cost in 2023 i.e.,only 30-35 percent of overall project costs were from the module alone.At current LFP prices,we estimate that modules account for only 20-25 percent of project costs.With the lower energy density of SIBs,even if second generation cells achieve a$40/kwh price at the cell level,there is less energy that you can pack into a container,and the non-cell costs dominate to an even greater extent.Figure 8.Project Cost Breakdown of LFP Based BESS in the United States in 202310%Other8%Interest During Construction/Fees18%EPC Costs9%HV Procurement55tteriesSource:Black&Veatch.SIBs competitiveness under certain conditionsTherefore,SIBs can be competitive in BESS only under at least some of the following conditions:Lithium exhibits extreme price volatility like in the previous cycle.There is a significant redesign of what a suitable BESS for SIB looks like,so that non-cell costs dont spoil the overall$/kwh economics.The BESS development is in a region of low soft costs(EPC,installation,etc.).Given sodiums wide availability and low floor costs,it is feasible that technology will evolve to find a way to make SIBs competitive against Lithium ion for BESS in the future.Note that in other applications,such as for low end EVs and bikes,SIB can compete favourably with LFP much sooner,as the balance of system costs in those applications are much smaller than for grid storage.SODIUM ION BATTERIES WHAT DO THEY MEAN FOR BESS?|13 Appendix:SIB Versus LIB ComparisonsTable 3.Summarised SIB Versus LFP Comparison Illustrating the Advantage of SIBItemsLithium-ion(LFP)Sodium-ion(Na-ion)Advantage of Sodium-ionMaterialCathode LiFePO4 As section 3.4Abundant Sodium resource AnodeGraphiteAmorphous carbonLow energy consumptionElectrolyteLiPf6NaPF6Replace Li with Na,cost-effectiveCurrent CollectorAluminum FoilCopper FoilAluminum FoilLower costPerformanceEnergy Density130-180110-16020%lower,hopefully catch up LFP in 2yearsCycles3000-80002000-6000Lower than LFPLow temperatureBadGood-40C discharging,20C chargingC-rateNormalGoodCharging to 90%in 15 min.SafetySafety FrontierNormal WideWide safety frontier of operation temperature,reduce the risk of battery abuse.Sodium-ion cells can be discharged down to 0V and shipped at 0V,increasing safety during shipping.StageIndustrializationMaturePromotion stage Cost(RMB/Wh)0.35-0.50.7-0.9(current)0.3-0.4(forecast)SODIUM ION BATTERIES WHAT DO THEY MEAN FOR BESS?|14 Table 4.Cell Parameter Comparison Sodium Ion Versus LFPHiNa BatteryVeken IndustryHithiumChemistrySodium-ionSodium-ionLithium-ion(LFP)Model NaCP73174207-ME185SIB 72173207-230AhLFP71173207/314Ah Dimension(mm)173.7*204.5*72.0 (L*D*W)174.2*204.5*72.0(L*D*W)174.7*204.5*71.7(L*D*W)Weight(kg)4.90.20kg=110=130=175Impedance(1KHZ,m)=0.250.180.05 0.200.05 Self-discharge/per month(%)=96%Recovery rage=99%(25C,storage 7 days)Retention rate=95%Recovery rage=97%(25C,storage 28 days)Retention rate=95%Recovery rage=97%(25C,storage 28 days)Retention&Recovery(High Temperature)Retention rate=95%Recovery rage=97.5%(45C,storage 7 days)Retention rate=85%Recovery rage=90%(60C,storage 7 days)Retention rate=95%Recovery rage=97%(55C,storage 7 days)Max.continuous charge1P1P1PMax.continuous discharge 1P1P1PDischarge temperate(C)-40-60-30-60Charge temperate(C)0-550-60Cycle life2,000 (45C,0.25P,EOL70%)5000 (25C,0.5P,EOL70%)2000 (25C,1P,EOL70%)4000 (25C,0.5P,EOL80%)6000 (25C,0.5P,90%DOD,EOL70%)=10,000 (25C,0.5P,100%DOD,EOL70%)SODIUM ION BATTERIES WHAT DO THEY MEAN FOR BESS?|15 ReferencesAbraham,K.M.(2020,10 23).How Comparable Are Sodium-Ion Batteries to Lithium-Ion Counterparts?Retrieved from ACS Energy Letters:https:/pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acsenergylett.0c02181Benchmark Minerals.(2022,12 14).Lithium prices hit record high as market pricing takes hold 2022 in review.Retrieved from Benchmark Source:https:/ Minerals.(2023,03 22).Over 100 GWh of sodium ion battery capacity planned for 2030 as industry seeks alternative to lithium.Retrieved from Benchmark Source:https:/ 6).Lithium-Ion Battery Pack Prices Hit Record Low of$139/kWh.Retrieved from https:/ 10).Lithium-Ion Battery Pack Prices See Largest Drop Since 2017,Falling to$115 per Kilowatt-Hour:BloombergNEF.Retrieved from BloombergNEF:https:/ News China.(2024,1 5).BYD starts construction of 30 GWh sodium-ion battery plant in China.Retrieved from Car News China:https:/ Storage News.(2025,January 30).BNEF:Bigger cell sizes,5MWh containers among major BESS cost reduction drivers.Retrieved from Energy Storage News:https:/www.energy-storage.news/bnef-bigger-cell-sizes-5mwh-containers-bess-cost-reduction/Inside EVs.(2021,7 21).CATL Unveils First-Generation Sodium-Ion Battery.Retrieved from Inside EVs:https:/ of the Chief Economist.(2024,12 20).Resources and energy quarterly:December 2024.Retrieved from https:/www.industry.gov.au/publications/resources-and-energy-quarterly-december-2024Qixing Jia 1,2.L.,Li,Z.,Ruan,H.,Luo,D.,Wang,J.,Ding,Z.,&Chen,L.(2024).A Review of Carbon Anode Materials for Sodium-Ion Batteries:Key Materials,Sodium-Storage Mechanisms,Applications,and Large-Scale Design Principles.Molecules.Rio Tinto.(2025,1).An Economic Impact Assessment of the Jadar Lithium-Borates Project.Retrieved from Rio Tinto Serbia:https:/ Electric.(2024,8 6).Sineng Electric to Supply Energy Storage Solutions to the Worlds Largest Sodium-Ion Battery Energy Storage Project.Retrieved from Sineng Electric:https:/en.si- Foundation.(n.d.).Battery Report(2024).Retrieved from Volta Foundation:https:/volta.foundation/battery-report-2024.SODIUM ION BATTERIES WHAT DO THEY MEAN FOR BESS?|16 GlossaryACAlternating CurrentMVMedium VoltageAhAmpere-hourNCA(Lithium)Nickel Cobalt AluminiumBESSBattery Energy Storage SystemNMC(Lithium)Nickel Manganese CobaltC rateCharging ratePCSPower Conversion SystemDCDirect CurrentPBAPrussian Blue AnalogueEVElectric VehiclePWAPrussian White AnalogueFSSFire Suppression SystemRMBRenminbiHVHigh VoltageSIBSodium Ion BatteryHVACHeating,Ventilation and Air ConditioningtTonnesKWHKilowatt hourTMOTransition Metal OxideLCELithium Carbonate EquivalentLCOLithium Cobalt OxideLFPLithium FerrophosphateLIBLithium Ion Battery Black&Veatch Corporation 2025.All Rights Reserved.The Black&Veatch name and logo are registered trademarks of Black&Veatch Corporation.This document is a marketing document intended to generally describe the experience of and services provided by Black&Veatch.It should not be considered a guarantee or warranty of performance of any type.Any final contract between Black&Veatch and a Client will contain appropriate negotiated guarantees and warranties.Rev.04/About Black&VeatchBlack&Veatch is a 100-percent employee-owned global engineering,procurement,consulting and construction company with a more than 100-year track record of innovation in sustainable infrastructure.Since 1915,we have helped our clients improve the lives of people around the world by addressing the resilience and reliability of our most important infrastructure assets.Follow us on .About Infrastructure AdvisoryOur advisory professionals work with energy,water and fuel asset owners and operators to provide economic,regulatory and strategic investment consulting to develop and execute plans that add value by optimizing asset and business portfolios.Owners and operators of infrastructure assets and systems require holistic infrastructure consulting capabilities and consultants who understand how a change in one piece of the enterprise can impact assets,costs,technologies,their workforce and customers.We provide integrated strategy,transaction advisory,business operations,regulatory and technology solutions for the power,water,oil and gas industries as well as commercial and industrial clients.Our highly experienced team of professional consultants bring together combined expertise in advanced analytics and practical business sense with extensive technology and engineering capabilities.We deliver solutions that work best for your program needs,organization,assets,and customers.In recent years,our professionals have been recognized globally for their leadership and expertise in energy storage technology and product certification.Across Asia Pacific,our infrastructure advisory team is made up of almost 100 consultants and operational performance professionals,integrated alongside more than 1,500 Black&Veatch other professionals in theregion.
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July 2025ContentsAbout this ReportThe Haze Outlook 2025 report provides a risk assessment of the probability of a transboundary haze incident affecting Indonesia,Malaysia,and Singapore for the year ahead.This is based on research conducted by the Singapore Institute of International Affairs(SIIA),a leading think tank in the region.The Haze Outlook 2025 is the seventh edition of this assessment.It is directed by Simon Tay,Chairman,SIIA and Associate Professor,Faculty of Law National University of Singapore.The authors are Khor Yu-Leng and Aaron Choo,respectively Associate Director(Sustainability)and Senior Assistant Director(Special Projects and Sustainability),SIIA,with Abigael Eminza and Claudia Nyon,who are Research Associates at Segi Enam Advisors.All views expressed in the report are those of the authors,unless otherwise credited.Our research includes quantitative information on weather factors,the impact of fires,and commodity prices.We also qualitatively consider government policies and private sector practices.These assessments are based on the SIIAs engagement with sustainability stakeholders in the region.In particular,the authors would like to thank the following for their assistance and insights over the past year(in alphabetical order):Ambank Berhad,ASEAN Specialised Meteorological Centre(ASMC),Asia Pacific Resources International Limited(APRIL)Group,Bumitama Agri,Euro Asian Investment Holding,Glenauk Economics,Golden Agri-Resources(GAR),Indonesian Palm Oil Association(GAPKI),ISTA Mielke GmbH/Oil World,Landscape Indonesia,Musim Mas,PM Haze,Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil(RSPO),World Resources Institute(WRI)Indonesia.We are also grateful to government officials of the region who have engaged with the SIIA for our sustainability programme.Established in 1962,the SIIA is a not-for-profit and independent think tank committed to fostering in-depth dialogues around politics,economic policy,and sustainability in ASEAN and the wider region.It is a founding member of the ASEAN-ISIS Network of think tanks for Track II engagement and convenes the ASEAN Think Tank Summit.In the field of sustainability and especially on the haze,the SIIA has been an early analyst and advocate.The SIIA championed the fight against the transboundary haze from 1997,when we co-organised Singapores first haze dialogue chaired by Simon Tay.Following the severe transboundary haze in 2013,the SIIA established the Singapore Dialogue on Sustainable World Resources(SWR)in 2014 which has since become a leading platform for discussion in the region about key sustainability challenges including the haze.1.ExecutiveSummary12.IssuestoWatchin20253 2.1.Weather:Milder and Shorter Dry Season in 2025 3 2.2.Markets:Short Term Resilience,Long Term Concerns 4 2.3.Policies:Progress and Future Challenges 73.QualitativeRiskAssessmentandConclusion10Annexes 11 Annex 1:Literature Review 11 Annex 2:Case Study on Peatland and Mangrove Restoration 13 Annex 3:EUDR and Digital Traceability 14References 15Amber1.ExecutiveSummaryGreen:Low riskAmber:Medium riskRed:High riskRiskofaTransboundaryHazeEventin2025:OurassessmentisthatthereisanAmberormediumriskofaseveretransboundaryhazeeventaffectingIndonesia,Malaysia,andSingaporefortherestof2025,on a scale of green,amber,and red,where red is the highest risk.Agricultural prices are elevated and there has been some uptick in deforestation,increasing the risk of fires and haze.There was an escalation in hotspots and smoke haze in parts of Sumatra in mid-July,with transboundary haze observed to drift from central Sumatra into parts of Peninsular Malaysia,affecting air quality there.There are also economic and policy shifts that may inadvertently trigger deforestation and higher haze risk,if fire is used to clear land.Increases in agricultural output are needed to meet rising demand for food security and energy.Care must be taken that this is done in a sustainable fashion and to avoid creating more fire-prone conditions.In the medium to long term,climate trends also suggest that another unusually dry season may occur around 2027-2030.Our assessment is based on three areas:weather,markets,and policies,and is informed by our engagement with governments,businesses,think tanks,and NGOs.Weather:The haze results from fires in the region and drier weather has driven past episodes of haze.For the remaining months of 2025,meteorologists are expecting a milder and shorter dry season peaking in August.The risk from weather is relatively benign for now,though the fires in late July show that weather is changeable and some areas remain fire-prone.Looking ahead,some suggest that another extreme hot and dry period could occur around 2027-2030.The ASEAN region must remain prepared to face future extreme weather events and fire seasons amidst a warming global climate.Markets:Fires that cause the haze are often linked to agricultural activity in the region and in commodity industries such as palm oil,pulp and paper,and others.Historically,spikes in agricultural commodity prices have been followed by increases in deforestation.Prices this year are elevated,and estimates show some uptick in deforestation in Indonesia from 2023 to 2024.Policies:Government and private sector efforts are crucial to keeping fires and haze under control,and to ensure that forests and plantations are sustainably managed.Indonesia has made significant strides in sustainable forestry and emissions reduction under the Jokowi administration,including a 2021 commitment to make its forestry and land use(FOLU)sector a net carbon sink by 2030.Fire incidents in 2024 remained low.The current Prabowo administration has said it will continue forest management policies.However,Indonesia faces a triple challenge in meeting food security,energy,and export imperatives.The question of food versus fuel is rising in prominence,especially as Indonesia plans to increase its biodiesel mandate alongside introducing a new bioethanol mandate for gasoline.NGOs such as Mighty Earth and environmental media organisations like Mongabay have said that Indonesias food and energy projects could result in more clearing of forests and peatlands.Care is needed to ensure that efforts to create new plantations are sustainable,and to increase the efficiency of existing plantations.1DeforestationandDemandEstimates by think tank Auriga Nusantara(Figure 1)show an uptick in deforestation in Indonesia between 2023 and 2024.This includes an uptick in provinces in Sumatra near Singapore and Peninsular Malaysia,where fires have spiked in July 2025.Despite some plantation expansion in recent years,analysts fear that supply is still lagging behind demand,pushing up the price of commodities.Palm oil produced in Indonesia and Malaysia is usually the worlds cheapest vegetable oil,but it has traded at a higher price than soybean oil at key destinations for nine consecutive months.Latin America,a major producer of soybeans,is the current global frontier for agricultural expansion.EconomicandPolicyShiftsAt the international level,commodity markets have so far stayed resilient despite imminent US tariffs.Another change which could affect markets is the EU Regulation on Deforestation-free products(EUDR),which will be implemented from 30 December 2025.Questions remain about its impact,and Indonesia has called for the EUDR to be further delayed to 2028.At the national level,the Prabowo administration is exploring plantation development in Papua and transferring control of land across the country to a new state-owned enterprise called Agrinas,alongside promoting downstreaming of its industries.There is also an ongoing court case against three companies accused of circumventing palm oil export restrictions in 2022.In July 2025,Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Budi Gunawan asked Indonesian agencies to increase firefighting efforts as transboundary haze was affecting neighbouring countries.This signals that the government is placing businesses under scrutiny,and is taking haze as an important issue.Our assessment is there is an Amber or medium risk of a severe transboundary haze event for the rest of 2025 though even if this occurs,the haze should not be as prolonged as the incidents in 1997-1998 and 2015.As our Haze Outlook in 2024 was Green,this is a concerning shift.Good policies are needed to ensure that ASEAN is not at the mercy of the weather when it comes to preventing haze.Regional cooperation plays a significant role and must be enhanced through the ASEAN Meeting of the Technical Working Group(TWG)and Sub-Regional Ministerial Steering Committee on Transboundary Haze Pollution(MSC)and other mechanisms.Figure1:DecliningdeforestationinIndonesiaSource:Chart and table from Simontini(2025),based on 2023 and 2024 estimates from Auriga Nusantara,and historical data from the University of Maryland and Ministry of Forestry,IndonesiaDeforestationinIndonesia,2001-2004200,000600,000800,000400,0001,000,0000Deforestation(ha)200120022003200420052006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232024TopTenProvincesforDeforestation,2024(hectares)2023West Kalimantan35,162Central Kalimantan30,433East Kalimantan28,633Central Sulawesi16,679South Kalimantan16,067North Kalimantan14,316Riau13,268South Papua12,640Central Papua11,336West Papua10,99027otherprovinces67,8582024East Kalimantan44,483West Kalimantan39,598Central Kalimantan33,389Riau20,812South Sumatra20,184Jambi14,839Aceh8,962North Kalimantan8,767Bangka Belitung7,956North Sumatra7,30327otherprovinces55,28222.IssuestoWatchin20252.1.Weather:MilderandShorterDrySeasonin2025The 2025 dry season has already seen a spike in fires in Sumatra,resulting in some transboundary haze affecting parts of peninsula Malaysia.However,the remainder of the dry season in 2025 is expected to be milder and shorter than most past dry seasons,peaking in August.For now,the weather is relatively benign,and fires can be kept under control unless the situation changes.Past haze incidents have frequently coincided with intense drought periods,corresponding to the positive phase of the El NioSouthern Oscillation(ENSO)and Indian Ocean Dipole(IOD)phenomena most recently in 2023,2019,and 2015(see Figure 2).ENSO refers to variations in sea-surface temperatures,rainfall,surface air pressure,and atmospheric circulation across the equatorial Pacific Ocean,while IOD is a similar phenomenon for the Indian Ocean.For the ASEAN region,the positive phases of both phenomenon bring drier conditions,while the negative phases correspond to wetter conditions.For 2025,ENSO-neutral conditions are expected for the remainder of 2025,through to early next year,while IOD is also expected to be neutral or negative.Southern ASEAN countries are still experiencing a dry season in the latter half of the year,but this is expected to be a relatively mild and shorter dry season.Figure2:ElNio-SouthernOscillation(ENSO)andIndianOceanDipole(IOD)Source:Khor Reports-Segi Enam Advisors(2025),based on data from the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration(NOAA)for 1995 to April 2025,Australias Bureau of Meteorology(BOM)for May and June 2025 and forecasts compiled to Dec 2025.ENSO-The Oceanic Nio Index(ONI;brown)and IOD-Dipole Mode Index(DMI;green)-positive and higher index points to dryer weather and larger negative index points to wetter weather.Australia BOM forecasts neutral ENSO and neutral-negative IOD for end 2025.Labelled intervals on x-axis are for Dec,Jan,Feb(DJF)at start of each year.3.01.52.01.0-2.0-1.01.00.5-1.0-0.50.00.0ENSO-ONI(left axis)IOD-DMI(right axis, ve is fire risk,-ve is wet risk)1995 DJF1996 DJF1997 DJF1998 DJF1999 DJF2000 DJF2001 DJF2002 DJF2003 DJF2004 DJF2005 DJF2006 DJF2007 DJF2008 DJF2009 DJF2010 DJF2011 DJF2012 DJF2013 DJF2014 DJF2015 DJF2016 DJF2017 DJF2018 DJF2019 DJF2020 DJF2021 DJF2022 DJF2023 DJF2024 DJF2025 DJF3 The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration(NOAA)reports a transition from La Nia conditions to ENSO-neutral during February-April 2025,with conditions persisting in June-August.For November-January,chances are 48 per cent ENSO-neutral and 41 per cent La Nia(NCEP,2025).The ASEAN Specialised Meteorological Centre(ASMC)notes that most models predict ENSO-neutral conditions from July-September 2025(ASMC,2025).Indonesias Meteorological,Climatological,and Geophysical Agency(Badan Meteorologi,Klimatologi,dan Geofisika or BMKG)concurs with the ENSO-neutral prediction.BMKG also predicts that the country will have a shorter-than-normal dry season,beginning gradually in June 2025,reaching its peak between July and August,and concluding before the end of September(UMS,2025).Australias Bureau of Meteorology(BOM)forecasts that IOD will remain neutral until July,and may shift to negative after July(BOM,2025).Notwithstanding the conditions in 2025,it is possible that another severely hot and dry season could occur between 2027 to 2030.The interval between IOD events is unpredictable.El Nio events are also irregular,but in general a El Nio period occurs every three to five years.The last El Nio was in 2023-2024,meaning that another could take place towards the end of this decade.If the El Nio is strong,and if this coincides with a positive IOD,it would increase fire and haze risk for that year.Beyond 2025,the ASEAN region still needs to remain on guard against human-induced activities that result in fires during future dry seasons.2.2.Markets:ShortTermResilience,LongTermConcernsThe Haze Outlook analyses market trends to determine if there are any factors increasing haze risk,comparing agricultural commodity futures to estimates of deforestation and plantation expansion.Historically,spikes in prices have been followed in subsequent years by rises in deforestation.Prices are currently elevated,and there has been a uptick in deforestation between 2023-2024,including in provinces in Sumatra,according to think tank estimates.Despite this uptick,analysts are concerned that plantation expansion and agricultural commodities supply are still lagging behind demand.This could further drive up prices.Notably,palm oil,a major export of Indonesia and Malaysia,has typically been the lowest-cost vegetable oil in recent history.However,in an unprecedented development,palm oil has been trading at higher prices compared to competing vegetable oils such as soybean in some key destinations for nine consecutive months.The global frontier for agricultural expansion is now Latin America,which is a major producer of soybeans and other agricultural products.Agricultural markets are connected and shifts in one market affect others elsewhere.USTariffsThe current high prices of palm oil and other agricultural exports from ASEAN are due to lagging supply versus rising global and regional demand,and are not directly related to the Trump administrations trade tariffs.Some ASEAN economies are more exposed to impacts from US tariffs,but US demand for Indonesian and Malaysian palm oil is seen as relatively inelastic.Even if US demand is affected,Indonesia and Malaysia have diversified export portfolios and can count on strong domestic demand for their own agricultural products to offset shifts in American demand.For the moment,US tariffs are therefore not having a strong effect on Indonesia and Malaysias agricultural sectors,though this could change as the situation develops.The US is a significant buyer of palm oil,but it is far from the largest.Indonesia is by far the worlds leading exporter of palm oil,and its palm oil trade with the US accounts for 7 per cent of its total export volume.This makes it fourth-ranked as an export market for Indonesia,behind China,India,and Pakistan,around the same level as the EU.4EUDRThere are also questions surrounding agricultural commodities trade with the EU,as the European Unions Regulation on Deforestation-free products(EUDR)is now scheduled to take effect for large companies from 30 December 2025,following a one-year delay(see Annex 3).The EUDR covers seven commodity categories and aims to ensure that products traded and consumed in the EU are not linked to deforestation.There has been some controversy over the regulation,with critics contending that the due diligence and data requirements of the EUDR are too stringent,particularly for smallholder farmers.Talks between the EU and its trading partners,including a trilateral Ad Hoc Joint Task Force(JTF)involving the European Commission,Indonesia,and Malaysia have made progress.The EU has streamlined the EUDRs reporting requirements,making compliance easier for businesses,but the matter of smallholder inclusion in supply chains has largely been left to the origin countries.Indonesia and Malaysia have created digital platforms to facilitate EUDR compliance,providing legality and traceability information.Smallholder farmers are included in these national systems.The platforms are intended to allow international buyers and trader-processors to file their EUDR due diligence submissions while still respecting Indonesian and Malaysian laws on data protection.However,it remains to be seen whether these systems will be fully embraced by buyers and EU officials,and consequently whether the EUDR will have lasting effects on trade flows.Indonesia has called for the EUDRs implementation to be further postponed to 2028 to allow all parties more time to prepare.CommodityPriceandDeforestationTrendsPrior to 2015,surges in agricultural commodity prices were typically followed by increases in tree cover loss and primary forest loss in Indonesia over subsequent years.Figure 3 shows total tree cover loss and primary forest loss in Indonesia represented by light and dark grey dashed lines,based on data from the World Resources Institutes(WRI)Global Forest Watch(GFW)platform.This data is compared,over time,to benchmark futures prices for selected key agricultural commodities in coloured lines.The severe fires and haze in 2015 acted as a wake-up call for policymakers and businesses.Since 2015,some change in tree cover has occasionally followed price increases.But tree cover is a general term including plantations.Shifts in tree cover could reflect replanting or a change from one plantation type to another.From 2015 to 2019,the rate of primary forest loss,referring to natural ecosystems,trended downward or remained largely flat despite commodity price shifts.Policy moves such as Indonesias permanent moratorium on new plantations on forest and peatland proved effective in reducing deforestation.Commentators note that there has been a shift from illegal deforestation to legal clearing within government-approved concessions(Jong,2025)in recent years.However,the situation since 2020 has been more complex than the 2015-2019 period.Think tank Auriga Nusantara(see Figure 1)estimates that there was an uptick in deforestation in Indonesia from 2023 to 2024,around 1.6 per cent.5Deforestation figures do not necessarily translate directly to the expansion of plantations.Figure 4 shows estimates on plantation expansion from consultancy The TreeMap(2025a,2025b)which operates the Nusantara Atlas platform.In 2023,there was a spike in industrial oil palm plantation expansion in Indonesia,though this came down by 9 per cent in 2024 compared to the previous year.For 2024,oil palm plantations expanded by 117,139 hectares.Pulpwood plantation expansion trended upwards from 2019 to 2022,though based on current estimates the expansion has declined year-on-year in both 2023 and 2024.Most of the pulpwood expansion seen in 2024 was on just two corporate concessions,rather than reflecting widespread activity by several companies.Figure3:DeforestationinIndonesiacomparedtocommoditypricesNote:Commodity futures price indices are relative to January 2000 as 100,deforestation rates in dashed lines are in millions of hectaresSource:Khor Reports Segi Enam Advisors(2025),based on data from the World Bank for palm oil and rubber futures,FastMarkets for pulp,and Global Forest Watch for primary forest and tree cover loss estimates.Benchmark futures prices used are Refined,Bleached and Deodorised(RBD)palm oil traded on Bursa Malaysia(dark green line),Technically Specified Rubber(TSR,light green line),and Northern Bleached Softwood Kraft or NBSK in China(brown line).2.50.00.51.52.01.07000100500600300400200200020052010201520202025Palm oil,RBD Malaysia($/mt)Rubber,TSR20($/kg)-indexPulp,NBSK-China($/mt)-indexIndonesia tree cover loss(GFW est.mill ha for the year)-right axisIndonesia primary forest loss(GFW est.mill ha for the year)-right axisIndonesias tree cover and primary forest loss(est.million hectares;grey dashed lines)and selected export commodity price indices(Jan 2000=100)6AchievingSustainableGrowthSome analysts such as Thomas Mielke,Editor and CEO of Oil World,note that while a decline in oil palm plantation expansion and related deforestation is positive from an environmental standpoint,the gap between supply growth versus increasing demand is concerning from an economic standpoint.Sustainable plantation development in non-forest areas is still needed,alongside a scaling up of efforts to replant aging areas with seeds that have been properly certified as good planting material.Efforts are also needed to address inefficient management in existing plantations,not just within the private sector but including government-linked businesses.2.3.Policies:ProgressandFutureChallengesGovernment and private sector efforts are crucial to keeping fires and haze under control,and in ensuring that forests and plantations are sustainably managed.The Haze Outlook explores government policies and private sector practices to understand the implications for haze risk.Between 2014 and 2024,Indonesian President Joko Widodo,properly known as Jokowi,led his administration in making major progress in haze prevention and ecosystem restoration.These policies are continuing under current Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto,who remains closely allied with his predecessor.Mr Prabowos Vice President,Gibran Rakabuming Raka,is Mr Jokowis eldest son.Indonesia agricultural industries face the challenge of needing to meet domestic food security and energy security needs,while also still generating revenue from exports.Policymakers and businesses will need to work together to balance these objectives without putting pressure on land use.Figure4:Decreaseinoilpalmandpulpwoodexpansionin2024Note:Data does not include smallholder expansionSource:Chart extracts from TheTreeMap(2024),based on data from Landsat and Sentinel-2 Time-series2006004000100500300700PulpwoodExpansion(x1000ha)200120022003200420052006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232024Non-ForestForest2006004000100500300700IndustrialOilPalmExpansion(x1000ha)200120022003200420052006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232024Non-ForestForest7ProgressundertheJokowiAdministrationAs the largest nation in ASEAN with vast forest and peat landscapes,and where haze is most acutely felt,Mr Jokowi and his government,notably the Ministry of Environment and Forestry,played a vital role in addressing the haze issue at the central government level.One of the first major challenges Mr Jokowi faced in office was the 2015 transboundary haze crisis during his first year.This cemented haze as a key issue of his presidency and paved the way for several progressive initiatives targeting ecosystems and haze,such as the establishment of the Peatland Restoration Agency(BRG)in 2016,later renamed the Peatland and Mangrove Restoration Agency(BRGM).As of 2025,the agency reported that it had restored 1.6 million hectares of peatland and 84,396 hectares of mangroves.Following the 2015 haze incident,the government said that companies involved in burning would have their permits revoked,and prosecutions of corporations liable for fires increased significantly.For example,the Supreme Court ordered PT Kallista Alam to pay US$26 million in fines and reparations,while PT Nasional Sago Prima was fined US$91.7 million.These high-profile rulings set a precedent for the high cost of non-compliance.In November 2021,ahead of COP26 in Glasgow,Mr Jokowi signed a legally binding presidential regulation committing Indonesia to achieve a net carbon sink for the forestry and other land use(FOLU)sector by 2030.As FOLU accounts for nearly half of Indonesias emissions,this move marked a major step toward meeting its Paris Agreement targets.If successful,it could deliver up to 60 per cent of the countrys emissions reductions while directly addressing haze by curbing deforestation and peatland fires.In 2021,Mr Jokowi also issued a carbon pricing and trading regulation,including the prospect of carbon credit generation from ecosystem conservation and restoration projects.There has been no severe transboundary haze affecting Indonesia,Malaysia,and Singapore since 2019,though less intense transboundary haze episodes have occurred in 2023 and more recently in July 2025.ThePrabowoAdministrationandChallengesFacingIndonesiaMr Prabowo has signalled he will continue Mr Jokowis forest management policies but has also set new priorities for his administration.Mr Prabowo is placing a strong emphasis on national self-sufficiency,alongside setting a target to achieve 8 per cent GDP growth by the end of his first term.Mr Prabowos growth target is in line with long-term ambitions to make Indonesia a high-income economy by 2045.At the same time,Indonesia faces several challenges.Even before the global economic uncertainty triggered by US trade tariffs,Indonesias fiscal space was already constrained.The countrys debt levels remain relatively high.Mr Prabowos initiative to provide free meals to schoolchildren will create domestic consumption and growth but will also weigh on state spending.The Prabowo administration has indicated that agricultural commodities production,and in particular palm oil,will remain a major part of Indonesias economic strategy.Palm oil alone contributes 2.5 to 5 per cent of Indonesias GDP and supports 16 million jobs.Indonesias industries will have to meet both food security and energy needs,while continuing to generate export revenue.The new administration must ensure that the development of Indonesias agricultural sector is conducted sustainably,in tandem with continued protection of the environment.There are several key initiatives that bear watching.8DanantaraandAgrinas:The Prabowo administration has created Danantara,a second sovereign wealth fund.One of the new state companies linked to the fund is Agrinas,formed from the merger of three existing enterprises.The palm oil unit,Agrinas Palma Nusantara,is set to control up to one million hectares of area zoned for plantations.If fully realised,this could give Agrinas a 6 to 7 per cent market share of Indonesias national palm oil output.Development in Papua:Indonesian policymakers are hoping to create more food and energy estates in the province of Papua,one of the last remaining frontiers for development.However,land development costs in the province are high,and plans must ensure that community rights and sustainability standards are respected.DownstreamingIndustries:The Prabowo administration is prioritising downstreaming for the commodities sector,aiming to strengthen processing and refining within Indonesia turning palm oil into oleo food products,oleochemicals,and vitamin precursors.The Ministry of Investment and Downstream Industry/Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board(BKPM)is focusing mainly on palm oil,though other crops like coconut are being explored.BiofuelMandates:Indonesias efforts to encourage the use of biofuels began under the Jokowi administration.This push is intensifying under the Prabowo administration as part of the nations broader downstreaming strategy.In early 2025,Indonesia increased its biodiesel blend from B35 to B40,referring to a 40 per cent vegetable oil content in diesel fuel.The increase is consuming an amount of palm oil comparable to Indonesias annual exports to a market like the US and EU.The Prabowo administration hopes to achieve a B50 blend for biodiesel within Mr Prabowos term.The Prabowo administration is also looking at a bioethanol blend for gasoline,starting with E5 as early as 2026,using feedstock from the countrys sugar industry.93.QualitativeRiskAssessmentandConclusionThere is a medium risk of a severe transboundary haze incident affecting Indonesia,Malaysia,and Singapore in 2025,rated as Amber on a scale of green,amber,and red.This assessment is based on three areas:weather,markets,and policies.The dry season in the latter half of 2025 is expected to be around the long-term average for past seasons,or milder and shorter than usual.While there have already been spikes in fires in Sumatra and some transboundary haze has affected peninsula Malaysia,the weather situation is relatively benign.Fires can be kept under control unless the situation changes.Looking at markets,commodity prices are elevated and there has been an uptick in deforestation in Indonesia from 2023-2024,including in Sumatra,according to some estimates which could correspond to increased fire risk.This underscores the need for good land and fire management policy for haze prevention.There are several issues to watch that may impact haze risk in the longer term.El Nio climate events occur roughly every three to five years,and the last El Nio was in 2023-2024.The IOD is less predictable,but it is possible that a strong El Nio could occur again around 2027-2030,possibly coinciding with a positive IOD effect as well.If this happens,lower rainfall and higher temperatures would increase fire risk for the ASEAN region.As global warming intensifies,the frequency of extreme weather events may also rise.Trade tensions persist,and it remains to be seen what effect US tariffs will have on global agricultural commodity markets and plantation industry activity in the coming months.The implications of current high palm oil prices also remain unclear.Global market shifts will affect Indonesias plans to develop its agricultural sector and promote downstream industries.Much will depend on Indonesias governance of its plantation and commodities industry.A high-profile court case is currently ongoing at the Supreme Court level,involving representatives of three companies who are accused of circumventing Indonesian palm oil export restrictions in 2022.Businesses and investors are watching the situation closely.The fact that agricultural commodity supply is falling behind the worlds increasing demand will have ramifications for both national economies and the global economy.Arguably,the world still needs efforts to increase palm oil and other agricultural commodity output in ASEAN ideally via sustainable expansion on non-forest areas,conversion of other croplands,yield increases,and replanting of aging areas.While national level action is critical,regional cooperation continues to play a significant role and must be strengthened.ASEAN is taking steps to enhance multi-stakeholder partnerships to promote sustainable land management,such as through the ASEAN Meeting of the Technical Working Group(TWG)and Sub-Regional Ministerial Steering Committee on Transboundary Haze Pollution(MSC)meeting.At the 26th MSC meeting held on 10 July 2025 in Brunei,the meeting noted the progress made in implementing the Second Roadmap on ASEAN Cooperation towards Transboundary Haze Pollution Control with Means of Implementation(Haze-free Roadmap 2023-2030),which is essential in driving forward the shared vision of a Transboundary Haze-Free ASEAN by 2030.Efforts to establish the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze Pollution Control(ACC THPC)should be prioritised.The SIIA aims to release a follow-up report that will analyse economic shifts and policy directions that may impact land management and haze prevention in the coming years.10AnnexesAnnex1:LiteratureReviewBuilding on our previous Haze Outlook reports,we reviewed 105 relevant recent studies related to the haze and peatland fires for 20242025.On the general topic of fire and land management in Indonesia,we identified 22 per cent on the social,political,and economic aspects of peatland fires,17 per cent on technical land management matters,and 11 per cent on fire management.The remainder covered other issues such as health and climate effects.Research on the socio-economic impacts of peatland fires and haze remains a major field for 20242025.Mendham et al.(2024)found that government programs in one village,Tumbang Nusa,in Central Kalimantan,had limited impact only 17 per cent of demonstration plots,16 per cent of capacity-building initiatives,and 11 per cent of livelihood programs remained active and adopted.Other significant studies about villages in peatland areas include Jalilov et al.(2024),Ekawati et al.(2024),and Puspitaloka et al.(2024).Yunus et al.(2024)estimated the total economic value of peatlands in Indonesias Riau province at USD 3,174 per household per yearabout 1.3 times the annual household income.Ilham et al.(2024)conducted a value-chain analysis in Riau,identifying commodities that could be an alternative to oil palm cultivation:pineapple,areca nut,fish,and honey.Studies on peatland management included research on rewetting and revegetation of peat areas(Elfis et al.,2024).Hooijer et al.(2024)reported positive effects on water levels and native tree species spontaneously growing on a site.In another study in Riaus Siak district,groundwater levels five meters away from canal blocks were significantly higher than in areas without them.Alhamd et al.(2024)and Wahyono et al.(2024).Widyastuti et al.(2025)found that repeatedly burned peatland had 10 per cent lower water-holding capacity than secondary forests.We reviewed 11 papers on greenhouse gas(GHG)emissions from fires and land degradation.Hu et al.(2024)conducted controlled field research in Sumatran peatlands,showing that emission factors(amount of pollutants released per unit burned)varied significantly across fire stages and weather conditions,demonstrating the complexity of measuring emissions.Cahyaningtyas et al.(2024)found that post-fire carbon storage was influenced more by fire severity and recency than by fire frequency.There were several impact studies on fine particulate matter,especially PM 2.5.(Grosvenor et al.,2024;Siregar et al.,2024;Madrigano et al.,2024,United States Environmental Protection Agency(EPA),2025).Graham et al.(2024)found indoor air quality during the 2023 fire and haze season in Central Kalimantan to be as poor as outdoor air,estimating that fires resulted in 93112 g/m PM2.5 concentrations,far exceeding WHO(15 g/m)and Indonesian(65 g/m)safe limits.On forest management policy,Chervier et al.(2024)found that there were mixed effects of Indonesias move to decentralise management to Forest Management Units(Kesatuan Pengelolaan Hutan,KPH)from 2001 to 2020 due to lack of resources in many areas.KPHs had a positive impact on fire-related forest loss,and the study found that earlier-established units also had better results.The authors note that KPHs have played a diminished role following newer programmes introduced by the Jokowi administration.11Key NGOs,campaigns,and media continue to scrutinise businesses for links to deforestation.Mighty Earth(2025)has reported on land clearing in Merauke,Papua,for rice cultivation.The Gecko Project(2024),in collaboration with Bloomberg News,has reported on businesses allegedly clearing forests in West Borneo.Jong(2025)in Mongabay reported on Auriga Nusantaras deforestation estimates.Bulolo(2024)in EcoBusiness has commented on the implications of the Prabowo administrations biofuel mandates.Mongabay recently reported on a spate of controversies,notably a group of South Sumatran residents suing pulpwood companies for recurring haze pollution,citing violations of their right to a healthy environment(Jong,2025).Other governance issues include indigenous concerns over government-backed projects in Merauke and other legal cases.12Annex2:CaseStudyonPeatlandandMangroveRestorationAlthough peatlands and mangroves occupy only 5.4 per cent of Southeast Asias land area,restoring and protecting these carbon-dense ecosystems can contribute substantially to climate change mitigation,while maintaining valuable ecosystem services,livelihoods and biodiversity.This is according to a recent study in Nature Communications by Sasmito et al.,2025 titled Half of land use carbon emissions in Southeast Asia can be mitigated through peat swamp forest and mangrove conservation and restoration.The authors of the study are international specialists from Australia,Indonesia,Singapore,the United Kingdom,and the United States.Notably,the authorship includes experts affiliated with Indonesian government bodies,namely the National Research and Innovation Agency(BRIN)and the Ministry of Forestry.The study showed that peatland and mangrove restoration is especially important in Indonesia,which accounts for roughly 72 per cent of the regions annual emissions from tree cover loss,fires,and land-use change on peatlands and mangroves.Indonesia has set a target of achieving a net carbon sink for its forestry and other land use(FOLU)sector by 2030.The study estimates that Indonesia has the potential to meet its FOLU emission reduction target of 500 Tg COe without external support by conserving peatland and mangroves.Carbon sequestration from peatland regrowth remained largely flat across all of the Southeast Asia region for the period 2017-2022,for unclear reasons,while mangrove regrowth continued to improve.Beyond 2022,it is expected that 66 per cent of the regions emissions reduction from ecosystem restoration will come from the rewetting of peatlands,with 33 per cent coming from revegetation of peat areas.FigureA1:CarbonremovalandemissionsreductionpotentialfrompeatandmangroveregrowthMangrove regrowthPSF regrowth2001030Carbonremovals(TgCO2e)20002005201020152020YearSource:Sasmito et al.(2025)Mangrove revegetationPeatland revegetationPeatland rewettingTree PlantationSmallholderOil PalmIndustrialOil PalmDrainage CanalDegraded PSFDeforested PSFAquaculture Pond01020305040Bare LandLandusetypesEmissionsreductionpotentials(TgCO2e/yr)13Annex3:EUDRandDigitalTraceabilityThe European Unions Regulation on Deforestation-free products(EUDR)was originally scheduled to take effect at the end of 2024.But its phasing-in period was delayed to give businesses and governments more time to comply.Currently,large and medium-sized companies have until 30 December 2025 to comply with the regulation,while micro and small enterprises have until 30 June 2026.The EUDR covers seven product categories palm oil,soy,wood,cocoa,coffee,cattle,and natural rubber.ASEAN economies are major exporters of most of these commodities,except for soy and cattle.Under the regulation,goods imported into the EU will need to prove they are not connected to any recent deforestation,defined as deforestation that occurred after 31 December 2020.Companies that fail to comply will be subject to checks and potentially fines or bans from the EU market.The regulation aims to ensure that a set of products traded and consumed in the EU does not contribute to deforestation anywhere in the world.There has been some controversy over the EUDR,with critics both within and outside the EU contending that the due diligence and data requirements of the EUDR are too stringent,particularly for smallholder farmers.Critics say that small farmers who cannot meet the reporting requirements will effectively be barred from exporting to the EU,or being part of supply chains that go to the EU.Talks between the EU and its trading partners on EUDR implementation have been underway since 2023,including a trilateral Ad Hoc Joint Task Force(JTF)involving the European Commission,Indonesia,and Malaysia.These have made progress.The European Commission recently announced changes to simplify the administration of the EUDR,including softened requirements for due diligence reporting.The changes are intended to“reduce the administrative burden”of implementing the EUDR(European Commission,2025).The changes include:Large companies can reuse existing due diligence statements when goods previously on the EU market are reimported.This means that less information needs to be submitted in the IT system.Companies will be allowed to submit due diligence statements annually instead of for every shipment or batch placed on the EU market.Downstream companies have simplified obligations.A minimal legal obligation of collecting reference numbers of Due Diligence Statement(DDS)from their suppliers and using those references for their own DDS submissions now applies.In principle,the changes will ease the administrative burden of EUDR compliance for large companies.The European Commission estimates the new measures will reduce administrative costs by 30 per cent.However,the above changes do not address the issue of smallholder participation in export supply chains.This has essentially been left up to origin countries to organise.Countries like Indonesia and Malaysia have embarked on large-scale digitalisation efforts to provide traceability from farm to destination,including smallholder farmers.These digital platforms are also intended to allow international buyers and trader-processors to file their EUDR due diligence submissions while still respecting Indonesian and Malaysian laws on data protection,letting companies go through the national dashboards.However,it remains to be seen whether the Indonesian and Malaysian systems will be embraced by buyers and EU officials.Ideally these platforms will be fully operational and deemed as completely meeting the EUDRs requirements.14References Alhamd,L.,Sundari,S.,Brearley,F.Q.,&Rahajoe,J.S.(2024,August 26).Effects of fire on tree species composition and carbon stocks of a peat swamp forest in central Kalimantan,Indonesia.Taylor&Francis.https:/ ASMC.(2025,June 4).Regional Climate-Seasonal Outlook.https:/asmc.asean.org/asmc-seasonal-outlook/Australian Bureau of Meteorology.(2025,June 12).Southern Hemisphere Monitoring Pacific,Indian and Southern Ocean regions.Australian Government Bureau of Meteorology.http:/www.bom.gov.au/climate/enso/?ninoIndex=nino3.4&index=nino34&period=weekly BMKG.(n.d.).Prediksi Musim Kemarau Tahun 2025 di Indonesia-Prediksi Musim.https:/www.bmkg.go.id/iklim/prediksi-musim/prediksi-musim-kemarau-tahun-2025-di-indonesia Bulolo,C.(2024,November 4).Will Indonesias biodiesel push put its climate goals at risk?Eco-Business.https:/www.eco- of peatland fires on above-ground carbon stocks in Kepulauan Meranti Regency,Riau Province.Journal of Tropical Forest Management.https:/journal.ipb.ac.id/index.php/jmht/article/view/50189 Chervier,C.,Atmadja,S.S.,Nofyanza,S.,Annisa,C.N.,Nurfatriani,F.,Kristiningrum,R.,Sahide,M.A.K.,Suhardiman,A.,&Umar,S.(2024,October 16).Impact of Indonesias forest management units on the reduction of forest loss and forest fires in Sulawesi.Science Direct.http:/ Climate Prediction Center/NCEP.(2025).Enso:Recent evolution,current status and predictions.https:/www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/analysis_monitoring/lanina/enso_evolution-status-fcsts-web.pdf Climate.gov.(2016,January 18).El Nio and La Nia:Frequently asked questions.NOAA Climate.gov.https:/www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/el-nio-and-la-nia-frequently-asked-questions Ekawati,S.,Siburian,R.,Yanarita,Surati,Nurlia,A.,&Sundary,L.V.(2024).Peatland Forest Fire Mitigation Policies:Impact on Traditional Farmers Food Security and Environmental Improvement.IOP Science.https:/iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1755-1315/1323/1/012014/meta Elfis,W,T.P.,Chahyana,Permatasari,&Norlis.(2024).Towards paludicultural agroforestry:Land use practice based on Malay local wisdom to support peatland rehabilitation in Riau Province,Indonesia.Mires and Peat.http:/mires-and- European Commission.(2025,April 15).Commission takes action to simplify the implementation of the EU deforestation regulation.European Commission-European Commission.https:/ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1063 The Gecko Project.(2024).Insider testimony points to“sustainable”conglomerate as hidden hand behind destruction of Rainforest.https:/thegeckoproject.org/articles/insider-testimony-points-to-sustainable-conglomerate-as-hidden-hand-behind-destruction-of-rainforest/Global Forest Watch.(2025).Brazil deforestation rates&statistics:GFW.Forest Monitoring,Land Use&Deforestation Trends.https:/www.globalforestwatch.org/dashboards/country/BRA/?category=forest-change Goldman,E.,Carter,S.,&Sims,M.(2025,May 21).Fires drove record-breaking tropical forest loss in 2024.World Resources Institute Research.https:/gfr.wri.org/latest-analysis-deforestation-trends?apcid=0065c4e47236be6ce5b0580115 Graham,A.M.,Spracklen,D.V.,McQuaid,J.B.,Smith,T.E.L.,Nurrahmawati,H.,Ayona,D.,Mulawarman,H.,Adam,C.,Papargyropoulou,E.,Rigby,R.,Padfield,R.,&Choiruzzad,S.(2024,November 3).Updated smoke exposure estimate for Indonesian peatland fires using a network of low-cost PM2.5 sensors and a regional air quality model-graham-2024-geohealth-wiley online library.Advancing Earth and Space Sciences.https:/ Grosvenor,M.J.,Ardiyani,V.,Wooster,M.J.,Gillott,S.,Green,D.C.,Lestari,P.,&Suri,W.(2024,November 2).Catastrophic impact of extreme 2019 Indonesian peatland fires on Urban Air Quality and health.Nature News.https:/ Hooijer,A.,Vernimmen,R.,Mulyadi,D.,Triantomo,V.,Hamdani,Lampela,M.,Agusti,R.,Page,S.E.,Doloksaribu,J.,Setiawan,I.,Suratmanto,B.,&Swarup,S.(2024,May 10).Benefits of tropical peatland rewetting for subsidence reduction and forest regrowth:Results from a large-scale restoration trial.Nature News.https:/ Hu,Y.,Smith,T.E.L.,Santoso,M.A.,Amin,H.M.F.,Christensen,E.,Cui,W.,Purnomo,D.M.J.,Nugroho,Y.S.,&Rein,G.(2024,October 22).Gambut field measurement of emissions from a tropical peatland fire experiment:From ignition to spread to suppression.CSIRO PUBLISHING.https:/www.publish.csiro.au/wf/WF23079 Ilham,Q.P.,Purnomo,H.,Rohadi,D.,Puspitaloka,D.,Herawati,T.,Brady,M.A.,Dermawan,A.,&Okarda,B.(2024,March 1).Value chain analysis for community livelihoods in peatlands:A case study in Southern Riau.IOP Conference Series:Earth and Environmental Science.https:/iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1755-1315/1315/1/012009/meta ITC.(2019).Trade Statistics for International Business Development.Trade Map-Trade statistics for international business development.https:/www.trademap.org/Jalilov,S.-M.,Lestari,S.,Winarno,B.,Yuwati,T.W.,Sakuntaladewi,N.,&Mendham,D.S.(2024,January 1).Why is tropical peatland conservation so challenging?findings from a livelihood assessment in Sumatra,Indonesia:Published in Mires and Peat.Mires and Peat.https:/mires-and- Jong,H.N.(2025,February 7).Surge in legal land clearing pushes up Indonesia deforestation rate in 2024.Mongabay.https:/ 2).Air Pollution and Blood Pressure:Evidence From Indonesia.Advancing Earth and Space Sciences.https:/ Mendham,D.S.,Sakuntaladewi,N.,Ramawati,Yuwati,T.W.,Budiningsih,K.,Prasetyo,B.D.,&Handoyo.(2024).Facilitating new livelihoods to promote peatland restoration in Indonesia-what are the challenges for ensuring sustainable and equitable livelihood transitions?https:/ Mighty Earth.(2025,February 7).Rapid Response:Palm Oil Report.https:/mightyearth.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/RR47_v1_7Feb2025.pdf Milko,V.(2025,April 7).Worlds largest deforestation project fells forests for bioethanol fuel,sugar and Rice in Indonesia.AP News.https:/ Puspitaloka,D.,Purnomo,H.,Juniyanti,L.,Andrianto,A.,Kusumadewi,S.D.,Okarda,B.,Zulkardi,&Dermawan,A.(2024).Adaptive business model development for community-based peatland restoration in Riau.IOP Science.https:/iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1755-1315/1315/1/012053/meta Safitri,R.,Saharjo,B.H.,&Basuki,I.(2024).The Impact of canal blocking to reduce fire risks and carbon emissions on tropical peatland,Siak District,Riau Province.IOP Science.https:/iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1755-1315/1315/1/012058/meta16 Sasmito,S.D.,Taillardat,P.,Adinugroho,W.C.,Krisnawati,H.,Novita,N.,Fatoyinbo,L.,Friess,D.A.,Page,S.E.,Lovelock,C.E.,Murdiyarso,D.,Taylor,D.,&Lupascu,M.(2025,January 28).Half of land use carbon emissions in Southeast Asia can be mitigated through peat swamp forest and mangrove conservation and restoration.Nature News.https:/ Simontini.(2025,March 10).Indonesia Deforestation Status 2024.https:/simontini.id/id/status-deforestasi-indonesia-2024 Siregar,S.,Idiawati,N.,Berekute,A.K.,Maulana,M.,Pan,W.-C.,&Yu,K.-P.(2024,November 6).Association between long-term PM2.5 exposure and mortality on Sumatra Island:Indonesian family life survey(IFLS)20002014-Environmental Monitoring and Assessment.SpringerLink.https:/ TheTreeMap.(2025a,February 16).Industrial palm oil deforestation in Indonesia slows slightly in 2024.Nusantara Atlas.https:/nusantara-atlas.org/industrial-palm-oil-deforestation-in-indonesia-slows-slightly-in-2024/TheTreeMap.(2025b,April 11).Industrial Wood pulp deforestation in Indonesia slows in 2024.Nusantara Atlas.https:/nusantara-atlas.org/industrial-wood-pulp-deforestation-in-indonesia-slows-in-2024/UMS.(2025,May 23).2025 dry season predicted to be shorter,heres why.UMS RSS.https:/www.ums.ac.id/en/news/global-pulse/2025-dry-season-predicted-to-be-shorter-here-s-why United States Environmental Protection Agency(EPA).(2025,March 27).Health and Environmental Effects of Particulate Matter(PM).https:/www.epa.gov/pm-pollution/health-and-environmental-effects-particulate-matter-pm Wahyono,S.C.,Kurnain,A.,Nata,I.F.,&Asyari,M.(2024,February 25).Investigation of Post-Fire Peatland Natural Recovery,South Kalimantan,Indonesia.Ecological Engineering&Environmental Technology.http:/ Widyastuti,M.T.,Haikal,M.,Minasny,B.,&Taufik,M.(2025,January 21).Frequent Fires Degrade the Hydrophysical Properties of Lowland Tropical Peatlands.SSRN.https:/ Yunus,M.,Pagdee,A.,&Baral,H.(2024,June 16).Economics of Peatland Ecosystem Services:A study of use and non-use values and people interplays in Sumatra,Indonesia.MDPI.https:/ AccessEstablished in 1962,the Singapore Institute of International Affairs(SIIA)is a not-for-profit,independent think-tank committed to policy-relevant research,analysis,and discussions on regional and international politics,economic policy,and sustainability.Our work serves as a bridge between policymakers,business leaders,and other stakeholders to nudge policy change through dialogue and collective action.We provide insights and perspectives for businesses in navigating a complex world and help Singaporeans with sense-making and responding to issues they care about.We aim to contribute to a region that is inclusive,peaceful,and prosperous An integrated,sustainable,and globally competitive ASEAN and a Singapore that is an open,dynamic hub and responsive node.We have been consistently ranked as one of the leading think tanks in Southeast Asia and the Pacific,in the Global Go-To Think Tank Index by the University of Pennsylvania.Since 2017,the SIIA was ranked the No.1 independent think tank in Asia.We were recognised as one of the top 50 think tanks globally,excluding the United States of America.In 2019,we were recognised as the No.1 think tank in South Asia,Southeast Asia,and the Pacific(excluding India).In 2020,we were also recognised as one of the think tanks with the best policy and institutional response to the COVID-19 pandemic.2025 Singapore Institute of International AffairsAbouttheSIIAsSustainabilityProgrammeOur Sustainability Programme began in 1997 when we organized Singapores first haze dialogue with the Singapore Environment Council on the critical haze problem.The programme has evolved to address a broader range of sustainability issues like agribusiness and forestry supply chains as well as the leveraging of green finance to advance ASEANs climate action and carbon neutrality goals.Since 2014,the Singapore Dialogue on Sustainable World Resources(SWR),our annual flagship conference,provides a platform for discussion in the region about key sustainability challenges.Ranked No.1 Independent Think Tank in AsiaASEAN-ISIS Network of Think Tanks Asia Society(USA)Strategic Partner UN ECOSOC Consultative StatusFor further information,contact the SIIA at:60A Orchard Road,#04-03 Tower 1The AtriumOrchard,International Involvement HubSingapore 238890 t| 65 6734 9600 f| 65 6733 6217 e|membershipsiiaonline.org w|www.siiaonline.orgSingapore Institute of International Affairsthink.siiasiia_sgsiia_tweet
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